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Exchange Rate Policy Reconsidered
ABSTRACT
The Bretton Woods Conference of 191414whichfixed exchange rates for over
twenty-five years is often cited as a model of economic cooperation among
countries.Yet over fifteen years have elapsed since the breakdown of the
Bretton Woods System without any serious efforts to restore fixed exchange
rates among the currencies of the major industrial countries. This paper
considers why governments may have refrained from "reforming" the exchange
rate system.
The first section of the paper examines the principal problem which
exchange rate policy is designed to address, exchange rate variability. The
paper distinguishes between the short run volatility of exchange rates, which
firms can hedge against in the financial markets, and longer term swings in
real exchange rates, which can lead to costly resource reallocation.
The paper reviews evidence concerning the effectiveness of exchange
market intervention, evidence which suggests that intervention may not be
effective unless it is monetized. The paper goes on to analyze arguments
concerning fixed exchange rates, and to assess the experience of two fixed
rate systems, Bretton Woods and the European Monetary System. Finally, the
paper examines the target zone system which has been proposed as an
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Iwould regard it as a catastrophe amounting to a world
tragedy if [this Conference should] ... allowitself to be
diverted by the proposal of a purely artificial and temporary
experiment affecting the monetary exchange of a few nations
only. ...Thesound internal economic system of a nation
is a greater factor in its well being than the price of its
currency in changing terms of the currencies of other nations
[from President Franklin D. Roosevelt's message to the London
Economic Conference of 1933].
It has been our task to find a common measure, a common
standard, a common rule applicable to each and not irksome to
any. ...[W}ehave perhaps accomplished here in Bretton
Woods something more than what is embodied in this Final
Act. We have shown that a concourse of 1414 nations are
actually able to work together at a constructive task in
amity and unbroken accord [J.M. Keynes at the conclusion of
the Bretton Woods Conference in 1914)4].1
The Bretton Woods Conference of 191414 which fixed exchange rates for over
twenty-five years is often cited as a model of economic cooperation among
countries. Indeed the Bretton Woods Agreement on exchange rates was a
remarkable accomplishment, particularly when measured against the failures of
earlier conferences such as the London Economic Conference of 1933. Yet over
fifteen years have elapsed since the breakdown of the Bretton Woods System
without any serious efforts to restore fixed exchange rates among the
currencies of the major industrial countries. The last attempt to reconstruct
the exchange rate system, the Smithsonian Agreement of December 1971, broke
down almost immediately. Recent economic summits have agreed on ad hoc
policies to counter exchange rate movements and have considered modest
proposals to modify the existing system, but these summits have made no
progress on more systemic changes in exchange rate arrangements. Governments
may have refrained from "reforming" the system for good reasons. This paper
will consider arguments for and against more far-reaching international
agreements on exchange rate policy.
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When considering possible reforms of' the exchange rate system, it is
natural to compare experience since 1973 with that of the Bretton Woods
period. The difference in economic performance between the two periods would
be startling if it were not so well known. Table 1 updates a table presented
in Goldstein (19814, p. 10) that compares recent inflation rates, growth rates,
and other economic variables with those of the Bretton Woods period. The
period since 1973 is divided in two parts to highlight more recent
developments in the 1980s.
Regardless of which indicator is chosen, the decade of the 1960s was a
time of' much superior economic performance. During the 1960s, inflation was
markedly lower in all major industrial countries, with the notable exception
of Japan where inflation in the 1980s is half what it was in the 1960s. A
more recent trend toward lower inflation rates, however, is observed by
comparing the 1981-85 and 1973—80 periods. Figure 1, illustrating the annual
inflation rates for the three largest industrial economies, confirms this
downward trend and also suggests that inflation rates for these countries may
be converging. But these recent favorable trends in inflation are not matched
by similar trends in output and other variables. Real growth in GNP was
higher during the 1960s in all countries. Productivity growth was higher in
all countries during the 1960s than during the 1973-85 period as a whole,
although in the United States and United Kingdom productivity growth during
the 1980s has exceeded that of the 1960s.2 Finally, unemployment rates were
in an entirely different range during the 1960s. In Germany, for example,
unemployment averaged only 0.8% in the 1960s, but 2.9% in the 1970s and a
depressingly high 7.1% in the 1980s. In the United Kingdom, a 2.6%
unemployment rate during the 1960s has turned into an 11.9% rate in the
27. 18 .2TABLE 1
COMPARISON OF MACROECONOMIC PERFORMANCE
IN THREE RECENT PERIODS
U.S.CANADA JAPANFRANCE GERMANYITALY U.K.
AVERAGE
INFLATION RATES:
1961—71 2.8 2.7 5.6 4.1 2.8 3.9 14•14
1973—80 8.5 8.7 9.5 10.1 4.9 114.9 14.0
1981—85 5.3 7.2 2.7 9.1 3.8 12.9 6.9
AVERAGE GNP
GROWTHRATES:
1961—71 3.6 5.2 10.4 5.4 4.2 5.2 2.8
1973—80 2.5 3.24 4.1 3.1 2.5 3.3 1.8
1981_85* 2.4 2.2 3.8 1.2 1.2 0.4 1.7
AVERAGE
PRODUCTIVITYGROWTH:
1961—71 2.9 4.5 9.8 6.4 5.5 6.5 3.8
1973—80 1.6 2.1 6.1 4.6 1LO 4.6 1.8
1981—85 3.7 2.24 5.3 4.5 3.9 3.5 5.0
AVERAGE
UNEMPLOYMENT RATES:
1961—71 14.8 24.9 1.2 1.6 0.8 5.1 2.6
1973—80 6.6 7.0 1.9 4.5 2.9 6.6 4.9
1981-85 8.3 10.4 2.5 8.7 7.1 9.6 11.9
*Until 198)4 for Italy
SOURCES: CPI indexes and GNP from IMF, International Financial Statistics;
productivity from U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics; unemployment












































































































































































1980s.Compared with the recent period of flexible exchange rates, therefore,
the 1960s appear to have been a golden era of economic performance.
Yet we should hesitate before attributing recent economic performance to
the switch from fixed to flexible exchange rates. Although flexible ratesmay
help to explain high inflation rates in the 1970s, it is much more difficult
to tie growth rates, unemployment rates, or productivity performance to a
nominal variable like the exchange rate. Nor is it easy tosay how the fixed
rate system would have performed in response to the economic disturbances of
the 70s and 80s, including the two oil shocks and the sharp changes in
macroeconomic policies undertaken in Britain and the United States. Rather
than try to account for this gap in economic performance, or to speculate
about how a different exchange rate system might have performed, the paper
will focus on the choices that are presented to policy—makers today. One of'
these choices is to return to fixed exchange rates, but in today's economic
environment this may prove as difficult as putting Humpty Dumpty together
again.
The paper addresses a number of issues important to exchange rate policy:
Exchange Rate Variability: The first section of the paper examines the
problem which exchange rate policy is designed to address, exchange rate
variability. It distinguishes between two types of exchange rate variability,
the short—run volatility of exchange rates characteristic of all asset prices
and the misalignment of exchange rates which may persist for several years at
a time. This distinction is crucial to an understanding of exchange rate
policy, since actions designed to reduce volatility may not be well suited to
countering misalignments.
Role of Sterilized Intervention: Casual observers may regard exchange market
intervention as the primary tool of exchange rate policy, yet existing
27.18.2evidence raises doubts about the effectiveness of intervention unaccompanied
by changes in money supplies. The second section of the paper reviews
existing statistical evidence on so-called sterilized intervention, then
studies two recent episodes of foreign exchange intervention in November 1978
and September 1985.
Fixed Exchange Rates: Those who look on the Bretton Woods System with
nostalgia may not recall how that system actually performed in practice. The
third section examines arguments for and against fixed exchange rates in
general. It then reviews experience under the Bretton Woods System as well as
the recently established European Monetary System.
Rules for Managed Floating: The fourth section considers various proposals
for managing exchange rates, including the rules adopted by the International
Monetary Fund in 1978. One ambitious scheme for exchange rate management
involves establishing target zones for the major currencies. The fourth
section examines target zones in detail because of the attention given to
targets in recent government and academic discussions.
1. The Problem of Exchange Rate Variability
Variable exchange rates pose problems for an economy, but the problems
vary widely depending upon the nature of the variability. A useful
distinction can be drawn between two types of variability, volatility and
misalignment. Volatility is the day—to-day, month-to-month variability of
exchange rates, a variability that may have no trend to it. Misalignment, in
contrast, is the persistent departureof an exchange rate from its long run
competitive level. Misalignment thus refers not to month—to—month variability
but to longer-lasting movements of exchange rates, and only to those movements
which depart from relative price trends, thus altering the relative
competitiveness of a country's goods.3 This distinction is important for
27. 18 .2—5—
intervention policy because a case might be made that only one form of
variability is harmful and therefore might Justify intervention. It must be
admitted at the outset, however, that this distinction between the two forms
of exchange rate variability is more easily made in theory than inpractice,
since exchange rates may exhibit their greatest volatility during periods of
misalignment. Nonetheless, the paper will consider each form of variability
in turn.
1.1. Volatility
One of the lessons learned from the voluminous literature on exchange
rate behavior written in the 1970s is that exchange rates behave like asset
prices, displaying much more volatility than most macroeconomic variables such
as output or the prices of goods and services.4 This is not surprising given
the dominance of asset trades in the determination of exchange rates. Table 2
examines the volatility of exchange rates using one measure of volatility, the
standard deviation of monthly percentage changes in exchange rates.5 This
measure of volatility, suggested by Lanyi and Suss (1982), counts as variable
only those movements in exchange rates which depart from an average trend
(measured as a percentage change).
Volatility Comparisons
Table 2 compares the volatility of' exchange rates with the volatility of
price ratios based on two aggregate price indexes, the consumer price index
and the wholesale price index, for the so-called Group of Five industrial
countries, France, Germany, Japan, United Kingdom and United States.
According to this table, bilateral exchange rates are more than twice as
volatile as these price ratios, in some cases more than five times as
volatile.6 This should not besurprising once it is recognized that, unlike
27.18.2TABLE 2
STANDARD DEVIATIONSOF MONTHLY PERCENTAGE CHANGES




NOMINAL BILATERALa 0.027)4 0.0279 0.0288 0.0255
REAL BILATERALa,b 0.0256 0.0272 0.0302 0.0271
NOMINAL EFFECTIVE° 0.0166 0.0229 0.0120 0.0113 0.0195
REAL EFFECTIVEb,c 0.0176 0.0208 0.0116 0.0118 0.0197
PRICES:
RATIOS OF CpItSa 0.009)4 0.0037 0.0039 0.0081
RATIOS OF WpItSa 0.0106 0.0123 0.0078 0.0090
STOCK INDEXES 0.0388 0.029L1 0.0580 0.0315 0.0597
COMMODITY PRICES COPPER COTTON RICE TIN WHEAT
0.01481 0.0656 0.0700 0.05)46 0.06)46
NOTES:
aAll bilateral comparisons are vis-a-vis the United States.
bReal exchange rates are measured using wholesale price indexes.
CEfféctive exchange rates are weighted averages of ten countries'
exchange rates (0—5 plus Belgium, Canada, Italy, the Netherlands, and
Switzerland); weights are based on total trade (imports plus exports) in
manufactures.
SOURCES: Monthly series: International Monetary Fund, International
Financial Statistics tape.
Trade weights: Morgan Guaranty Trust, World Financial Markets.
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many goods prices which are changed only infrequently, exchange rates are free
to respond to any new information hitting the exchange markets.
Even though exchange rates are volatile when compared with price indexes,
however, they are less volatile than some asset prices like stock exchange
indexes. And exchange rate volatility is also generally lower than the
volatility of commodity prices quoted on organized exchanges. Table 2 also
reports volatility measures for both sets of variables. Notice that three
agricultural commodities important to farming communities, cotton, rice, and
wheat, have almost three times the volatility of exchange rates.
That exchange rates are so much more volatile than prices should suggest
that the volatility of real exchange rates is also quite large. Table 2 also
provides evidence that real rates are about as volatile as nominal rates.
This table presents volatility measures of' nominal and real bilateral exchange
rates as well as nominal and real effective exchange rates. Throughout the
paper, the real exchange rate (Rt) is defined as the ratio of the domestic
price index to the domestic currency value of the foreign price index
(XtP) where is the domestic currency price of the foreign currency:7
(1)
RtP/(XtP)
The domestic and foreign prices used are wholesale price indexes (or WPI's)
which are available on a monthly basis for most industrial countries.
Effective exchange rates are obtained by weighting the exchange rates of ten
countries (G—5 plus five medium-size industrial countries) by the share of
total trade in manufactures (imports plus exports) of one country with each of
the other countries.8 The lesson to be learned from this table is an
important one: real exchange rates are volatile primarily because nominal
exchange rates are volatile. That is, the relative stability of price levels
27. 18.2—7—
means that nominal exchange rate volatility translates into real exchange rate
volatility.
Excessive Volatility?
Recent studies have addressed the question of whether asset prices are
excessively volatile relative to the underlying factors determining their
values. Shiller (1979), for example, studies whether long term interest rates
are excessively volatile relative to interest rates on short term bonds. He
finds that the volatility of long rates exceeds the limits imposed by term—
structure models which represent long term rates as averages of expected short
term rates. The same type of methodology can be used to investigate the
volatility of exchange rates.9 But the tests are valid only if the researcher
uses the correct underlying model of exchange rates, and there is little
consensus about the appropriate model to use)0 Huang (1981) shows that
exchange rates are excessively volatile relative to a monetary model of
exchange rates. But exchange rate volatility has yet to be investigated in
terms of other models, so whether exchange rates exhibit excessive volatility
remains an open question.
Changes in Volatility over Time
We have lived with flexible exchange rates for over a decade now, but
there is no evidence that exchange rate volatility has declined as traders
have become more accustomed to flexibility. Figure 2 illustrates the pattern
of volatility over time for the real effective exchange rates for the yen and
dollar. (The currencies in the European Monetary System, including the
Deutche mark, are discussed in Section 3). Volatility is measured over the
twenty-four months immediately prior to each time period. The yen and dollar







































































































































































.nd by changes in U.S. policy (to be discussed below). There are no
.Lous trends in these series.
No doubt exchange rates are much more volatile than they were under the
so—called fixed exchange rate regime of the 1960s. Table 3 uses quarterly
data for real effective exchange rates to compare volatility during the 1960s
with that of the more recent period from 1973 to 1985. Volatility is defined
as the standard deviation of quarterly percentage changes. The results are
quite clear: the Bretton Woods System's band around par values did constrain
the volatility of real exchange rates. The two currencies experiencing only a
marginal increase in volatility, the franc and mark, are those which have been
tied together in European exchange rate arrangements, first the SNAKE and more
recently the European Monetary System.
Effects on Trade
To what extent should we concerned with volatility per se? That question
is difficult to answer. There is ample evidence that the movements in
exchange rates reflected in the volatility measures are mostly
unanticipated. (For example, forward premiums explain only a fraction of the
variance of spot exchange rate changes.) So trading firms must cope with
uncertainty about exchange rates. In drawing up contracts involving foreign
exchange exposure, firms must take into account this uncertainty. They may
elect to purchase forward exchange, but the forward market is limited to less
than a dozen currencies, and for most of'thesecurrencies the market is thin
for all but the shortest maturities. (Note, however, that limiting hedging
alternatives to less than a dozen currencies is less restrictive than it seems
since most of the other currencies in the world are tied to the major
currencies.) They may use the Eurocurrency markets to hedge their currency
exposure, matching assets and liabilities in differentcurrencies (the range
27.18.2TABLE 3
STANDARD DEVIATIONS OF QUARTERLY PERCENTAGE CHANGES
IN REAL EFFECTIVE EXCHANGE RATES
JAPAN FRANCE GERMANY
KINGDOM
FIXEDEXCHANGE RATE PERIOD: 1960 I -1971I:
0.0066 0.0070 0.0155 O.O141 0.0162
FLEXIBLE EXCHANGE RATE PERIOD: 1973 II —1985IV:
0.0281 0.0377 0.0185 0.0193 0.0391
SOURCES: Same as Table 2.
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ofcurrencies available closely corresponding to the set available in the
forward markets). They may take advantage of currency swaps which expand the
range of foreign currency instruments available to the average company. Firms
may also take advantage of the relatively new markets for options on foreign
exchange, particularly when bidding on contracts. Finally, large
multinational firms can diversify away much of the exchange risk. These
hedging and diversification strategies are not without costs, including the
additional managerial effort required to monitor exposure. These costs must
be weighed against whatever benefits the present system affords.
Despite strong evidence that exchange rate volatility is much greater
under flexible rates than under fixed rates, it has been difficult to
establish statistically that this increase in volatility has seriously
affected international trade. Hooper and Kohlhagen (1978) studied the effects
of volatility on bilateral trade flows of the United States and Germany with
other major industrial countries. They found "absolutely no significant
effect of exchange risk on the volume of trade" (p. 505). Cushxnan (1983)
found some evidence of reduced trade using the volatility of real rather than
nominal exchange rates as his measure of risk. Kenen and Rodrik (19814), using
multilateral trade data and effective exchange rates for eleven countries,
also found some limited evidence of trade reduction. But for some countries
in their sample, higher volatility seemed to increase rather than reduce
trade. The strongest evidence in favor of trade reduction effects was
provided by Akhtar and Hilton (19814) who examined aggregate export and import
behavior in the United States and Germany. Using a longer sample period than
Hooper and Kohlhagen who studied the same two countries, Akhtar and Hilton
found that German exports and imports were significantly reduced as a result
of the increased volatility of nominal effective exchange rates, measured as
27. 18.2-la-
the standard deviation of daily exchange rates. Even thatstudy, however,
found that U.S. imports were unaffected by volatility, and U.S.exports only
marginally so. How is this evidence to be interpreted? It may be that
opportunities for hedging and diversification are sufficient to limit the
impact of volatility on trade. But it also may be that our econometric
methods are not sufficiently powerful to determine the effects ofvolatility
on trade.
Example of a Trading Firm
At this point it is useful to remind readers that volatility as defined
is very different from the persistent misalignment of exchange rates thatwe
have experienced recently. When the rise in the dollar leads to a loss of
competitiveness for U.S. goods of more than thirty percent, as has happened
over the last several years, trade is bound to be affected regardless of how
successful firms are in reducing the effects of exchange rate volatility.
The distinction between the two concepts can be illustrated by a simple
example. Suppose an American firm regularly exports goods to Germany for sale
in that country. Whether these goods are invoiced in dollars or marks
determines which firm, the American exporting firm or the German importing
firm, bears the "transaction risk", the exchange risk associated with a
particular export contract. If the mark/dollar (or DM/$) rate fluctuates
widely around an equilibrium value of DM2/$ (i.e., if the DM/$ rate ishighly
volatile), that risk can be considerable. The firm bearing the transaction
risk, however, may elect to purchase a forward contract to hedge this risk.
Alternatively, the risk can be reduced by appropriate financing or
diversification strategies. Contrast the same American firm faced with a
misalignment of the DM/$ rate at a level of DM3/$ (as occurred in the early
1980s). If this misalignment is persistent, then the firm will find its
27.18.2—.11—
"economicexposure" can not be hedged so easily. The firm may be faced with a
choice between shutting down or shifting its production facilities abroad.
1.2. Misalignment
Economists writing on flexible exchange rates in the 1960s contemplated
neither the magnitude nor the persistence of the changes in real exchange
rates that have occurred in the last fifteen years, so the term "misalignment"
is a relatively new one. In his recent study of exchange rates, Williamson
defines misalignment as the "persistent departure of the exchange rate from
its long run equilibrium level" (Williamson, 1985, p. 13). Defining such a
long run equilibrium is no simple task. Williamson identifies the long run
equilibrium exchange rate as
that which is expected to generate a current account surplus
or deficit equal to the underlying capital flow over the
cycle, given that the country is pursuing 'internal balance'
as best it can and not rericting trade for balance of
payments reasons [p. 114].
It is evident that such a definition refers to the real rather than the
nominal exchange rate, so the nominal exchange rate has to be adjusted by
relative prices through time if inflation differentials are significant. This
is analogous to calculating a purchasing power parity (or PPF) exchange rate
relative to some base period. But Williamson's concept of the long run
equilibrium rate is more sophisticated than a PPP concept since it also takes
into account real shocks such as the OPEC price increases of 1973—714 and 1978—
79.
This paper will discuss some of the problems involved in defining long—
run equilibrium when we analyze target zones for exchange rates. In this
section, there is no need to be specific about what is the equilibrium level
of any exchange rate in order to illustrate the extent of movement of real
























































































commonly cited measure of' real exchange rates, real effective exchange rates
based on wholesale prices in manufacturing, is used to illustrate the
movements of the dollar, yen, and pound sterling over the period since the
start of floating in 1973. The series illustrated are provided by Morgan
Guaranty Trust in its World Financial Markets. The figure illustrates clearly
the wide swings in real exchange rates which have characterized these
currencies.12 In the period since 1973, the most serious cases of
misalignment among the industrial countries occurred with respect to the pound
sterling and the dollar. Between 1976 and 1980, the pound rose by over forty
percent in real effective terms. Between 1980 and 1985, the dollar rose more
than thirty-five percent using yearly averages.13 Its peak in February 1985
was forty-two percent above its 1980 average. Both cases of misalignment will
be studied in detail in order to show the extent of the misalignment and its
effects on the economies concerned. Before doing so, however, the paper will
discuss some of the costs associated with misalignment to show why there is so
much concern about it.
Costs of misalignment
When real exchange rates are misaligned, there are incentives to shift
resources, both internally and externally. Internally, whenever the rate is
overvalued, services and other so—called "nontradable" industries gain at the
expense of export and import-competing or "tradable" industries. Externally,
foreign competitors gain at the expense of these same industries. These
shifts in resources are costly.1
Misalignments of the size experienced recently, where competing countries
gain a price advantage of 20 or 30 percent, can have very disruptive effects
on firms producing traded goods. Since misalignments may persist for five
years or more, production facilities in some tradables industries may be
27.18.2—13-.
mothballed or scrapped altogether even though these facilities might be
internationally competitive at exchange rates closer to their long run
equilibrium levels. Short-run losses of competitiveness due to misalignment
can easily become permanent in cases where foreign firms are able to establish
themselves in an industry. Baldwin and Krugman (1986) have shown that such
irreversible changes can occur in industries where costs of entry (e.g.,
investment in marketing and distribution) would deter foreign competition in
the absence of the misalignment.
If a firm is a multinational, it might elect to shift the production
facility threatened by the misalignment to lower—cost countries. That
decision is not without peril, however, since today's undervalued exchange
rate might swing to overvaluation as did sterling in the late 1970s. A firm
electing to locate a production facility in Britain in the mid 1970s would
have been unpleasantly surprised by the real appreciation that followed.
Even if domestic production facilities are merely rnothballed, moreover,
the resulting unemployment is costly. Given sufficient time, the labor force
can be retrained and reassigned to non-tradable industries. But even if such
shifts of employment between industries can be effected, the costs involved
are still significant. The decision to shift to a new industry is made more
difficult by three factors. First, it is as unclear to the labor force as it
is to firms how long the misalignment will last. The decision of employees to
seek employment elsewhere or of firms to close facilities must be made despite
the considerable uncertainty about the timing of any return to equilibrium.
(Recall the uncertainty about the timing of the dollar's fall). Second, it is
hard to disentangle long run shifts in comparative advantage from
misalignment. The U.S. steel and automobile industries, for example, were no
doubt hurt by the misalignment, but the growth of foreign production was
27.18.2-1 J4_
important as well. Third, there is the uncertainty about future protectionist
measures which might shield an industry from both misalignment and secular
declines in competitiveness. These sources of uncertainty make it difficult
for both the labor force and firms to make decisions. In the early 1980s auto
workers, for example, had to decide whether to retrain and possibly relocate
on the basis of their assessment of the duration of misalignment, the long
term prospects of the auto industry, and the political economy of
protectionism. This was a formidable task indeed-—one certainly beyond the
skills of economists.
The costs of misalignment are not limited to the firms and labor force in
the tradables sector. First, the economy as a whole must adjust its
consumption of nontradables if the resources shifted to that sector are to be
fully employed. Since the relative price of tradables has fallen, that shift
in nontradables requires an increase in total consumption relative to its long
run sustainable level. A capital account surplus will finance this consumer
surge, but at the cost of a buildup of debt. So one of the costs of the
misalignment, as emphasized earlier by Hause (1966) and Johnson (1966), is a
major shift in the time pattern of consumption.15 The second cost is one
alluded to earlier, the cost of tariffs and other protectionist measures which
may be introduced in response to the misalignment. In his study oftrade
tensions between the United States and Japan, Bergzten (1982) points out the
three recent periods when protectionist pressures were at their height in the
United States were times when the dollar was most overvalued relative to the
yen. The costs of protectionist legislation if enacted, whichwould be
"justified" by the need to protect the tradables industries, are borne by
consumers throughout the economy.
27.18.2-15-
Some of the costs associated with misalignments are illustrated by the
two most serious cases of misalignment among the major industrialcountries,
those of Britain and the United States.
The misalignment of sterling in 1979—82
The run-up of sterling began before the Conservative Government ledby
Margaret Thatcher took office in June 1979, but during the first three years
of that Government the misalignment problem became severe. Sterling rose from
$1.70/L in 1976 to $2.140/L in 1980. The rise in the nominal value of'
sterling,moreover, was matched by its rise in real terms. Figure 3above
shows a rise in the real effective exchange rate for sterling by 145%between
1976 and 1981. Recall that this series for the real exchange rate is based on
manufacturing prices, so the rise in the index reflects a startling loss of
price competitiveness in Britain's principal export sector. A real
appreciation of this magnitude led to what was called at the time the
"deindustrializatjon of Britain."
This appreciation is usually attributed to two main factors: the
discovery and exploitation of North Sea oil and the commitment to tight
monetary policy by the Thatcher government. Although North Sea discoveries
began in the early 1970s, production rose sharply only in the late 1970s, from
16.6 million tons in (the financial year) 1976—77 to 79.6milliontons in
1979_80.16 So the timing of sterling's rise coincides roughly with the rise
in North Sea production (although not with the exchange market's anticipation
of this rise). In a detailed study of economic policies under the first
Thatcher Government, however, Buiter and Miller (1983) find that at most 10
percent of the real appreciation can be attributed to the effects of North Sea
oil.17 The second factor, tight monetary policy, also undoubtedly played a
role in the appreciation. The appreciation, however, may have been due more
27.18.2—16—
to the announced targets for money growth rather than actual money growth
performance, since actual money growth (at least for the broader aggregates)
repeatedly outran the targets. After evaluating these and other explanations
of the appreciation, Buiter and Miller conclude that much of the appreciation
remains unexplained; indeed, they "find the decline in competitiveness
puzzling" (1983, p. 317).
How much of this real appreciation represents misalignment of the real
exchange rate from its equilibrium level? The discovery of North Sea oil
shifted the equilibrium real exchange rate, so some of the loss of
competitiveness of' British manufacturing might be better termed "realignment"
rather than "misalignment." That is, some of the real appreciation of
sterling reflected the necessary adjustment of relative prices called for by
this real shock. But what about the real appreciation due to the monetary
tightening (or prospective monetary tightening)? If misalignment is defined
as the departure of the exchange rate from its equilibrium level, then the
overshooting of the exchange rate associated with monetary tightening should
be labelled misalignment. The monetary policy itself may have been desirable
as part of a disinflation policy, but the accompanying temporary overshooting
of the exchange rate imposes adjustment costs which are just as severe as when
the exchange rate becomes misaligned as a result of exchange market
inefficiences or speculative bubbles.
The effects of the appreciation on the British manufacturing sectOr were
usually severe. Value added in manufacturing fell by over 8% in 1980 and by
over 6% in 1981 compared with declines of 2% or less in GDP in these same two
years. The effects on employment in manufacturing were slower to develop, but
appear to be longer lasting. According to Figure U, employment in

























































































































































continued to decline in 1982 and 1983. The effects of sterling's loss of'
competitiveness were devastating for British manufacturing. The term "Dutch
Disease" is used to describe the loss of competitiveness of a manufacturing
sector when oil or gas discoveries drive up the exchange rate. Britain seems
to have suffered from a particularly virulent strain of this disease, although
as argued above the causes of the illness cannot be attributed to North Sea
oil alone.
Misalignment of the Dollar, 1981-85
The dollar has more recently been misaligned as seriously as the pound
sterling was in 1980-82, but the effects of the misalignment on employment
have been mitigated by strong domestic demand for U.S. goods. Figure 5 traces
three real effective exchange rates for the dollar, all based on prices in the
manufacturing sectors of the United States and its trading partners. The
three prices represented are wholesale prices, value added deflators, and
normalized unit labor costs. The real exchange rates measure U.S. relative to
foreign prices or labor costs, so a rise in any of the real exchange rate
series represents a real appreciation of the dollar and a loss of
competitiveness for U.S.manufactures.18 The sharp appreciation of' the dollar
from 1980 to 1985 is seen in all three series, appreciations of from 314 to 143
percent in five years.
The origins of the appreciation remain a controversial subject. Among
the principal causes cited are the fiscal policies of the Reagan
Administration, the tight monetary policies pursued by the Federal Reserve
Board since Paul Volcker became Chairman in 1979, the rise in investment
associated with the Tax Reduction Act of 1981, and the flight of capital to
the "safe haven" of U.S. capital markets. Branson (1985) presents the
























































































































































































































policies.Although the defense buildup and tax cuts were spread out over
several years, Branson argues that the Reagan Administration made credible
"announcements" concerning this policy in 1981, a year when the dollar rose
sharply. Obstfeld (1985) also attributes much of the rise to fiscal policy,
but he emphasizes the separate contribution of foreign fiscal authorities. In
a back-of—the-envelope calculation of fiscal effects, he attributes to fiscal
policy a real appreciation of a little over 20 percent, but almost half of
that appreciation is due to foreign fiscal policy. Frenkel (1985) argues that
the initial rise in the dollar (in 1980) was due more to actual monetary
policy than to expected future fiscal policy. He cites the rise in short-term
interest rates which could not have been due to fiscal actions several years
in the future. Evidence for the role of investment and the "safe haven"
flight of capital is harder to find. Branson points out that while the level
of investment rose sharply in the 1983-85 recovery, the level of investment
relative to GNP was not unusually high in that period. "Safe haven" effects
may have been at work during the period, but it is hard to arguethat the
degree of political risk in Europe at least was higher in the 1980s thanin
earlier postwar periods.19
Unlike the origins of the misalignment, the effects on U.S. trade are
unmistakable. The export and importing-competing sectors of the U.S. economy
have been hard hit. Table 4reportsthe trade balance by sector in two years,
1980and 1985, aswell as the percentage change in the trade balance over this
period measured as a percentage of exports in 1980. According to this table,
the sectors hardest hit by the misalignment were the auto and general consumer
goods sectors; the trade balance in autos deteriorated by almost 180%of 1980
exports during this five year period, while the trade balance in general
consumer goods deteriorated by over 200%. Even the capital goods sector,
27.18.2TABLE 11
U.S.TRADE ACCOUNT
(INBILLIONS ON CURRENT $)
180 18 %CFIANGE
1980-85
MERCHANDISE TRADE BALANCE -27.7 -122.1 143.3
Agriculture and Raw Materials 32.7 1.3 -30.5 Fuels —79.1 —50.5 36.2
Manufactures 15.3 —81.2 -90.3
Capital Goods 143.14 11.6 _Lr3.3
Autos —10.2 140.6 -179.9
Consumer Goods —17.9 -52.2 -207.9 Other 3.14 8.2 57.8
*Measured as a percent of exports in 1980 (imports in thecase of fuels).
SOURCE: Survey of Current Business, National Income and ProductAccounts.
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normally the strongest of the U.S. manufacturing sectors, deteriorated sharply
with the trade balance falling to $11.6 billion from a 1980 level of $L3i
billion. The trade balance as a whole went from a deficit of $27.7 billion in
1980 to an alarmingly large deficit of $122.1 billion in 1985.20
The misalignment, of course, was not the sole cause of this deterioration
in U.S. trade performance. During the 1980-85 period, growth in Europe lagged
behind that in the United States, causing faster growth of imports in the
United States. In addition, the debt crisis forced Latin American countries
to curtail their imports from the United States, a factor which may be
particularly important in explaining the fall in U.S. exports of capital
goods. But the trade sector had to have been seriously affected by a change
in relative prices of the magnitude experienced.
The misalignment led to a fall in production and employment in many
subsectors of manufacturing. Branson and Love (1986) have estimated
disaggregated equations for production and employment in the United States to
determine the effects of the dollar's appreciation. They attribute a loss of
1.3 million jobs in U.S. manufacturing to a L0percentappreciation of the
dollar. This job loss was concentrated in the durable goods sectors, with
many of these jobs being lost in two of those sectors, primary metalsand non-
electrical machinery. Nonetheless, the effects of the dollar's appreciation
on industrial production and employment were not as severe as in the case of
Britain for two reasons. First, the trade sector is much less important to
the U.S. economy than it is to the British. Perhaps more importantly, the
appreciation coincided with a defense buildup as well as a consumer boom which
kept domestic demand for U.S. goods strong despite the inroads made by foreign
goods.
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The two case studies serve to illustrate the disruptive effects of
sizable misaligrunents. One sector of the economy, the tradables sector,
suffers inordinately during the period of the misalignment while the rest of
the economy stumbles on. During the period of sterling's misalignment, the
dichotomy between traded and nontraded sectors took a geographical form. The
north of England, where traditional industries such as steel and automobiles
were centered, suffered from severe unemployment, while the area around London
remained relatively prosperous. In the United States, the contrast in
fortunes between the rust-belt and the sun-belt can be explained at least in
part by the deterioration of U.S. competitiveness associated with the
appreciation of the dollar.
The problems associated with misalignment thus differ markedly from those
associated with volatility. No simple hedging strategy can protect a firm
from a loss of relative competitiveness of thirty per cent or more.
Having defined these problems of exchange rate variability, the paper now
turns to the search for solutions. Some observers might contend that the
solution is obvious: governments must adopt policies designed to minimize the
variability of exchange rates. Yet the fact that there are costs associated
with volatility and misalignment does not in itself justify policies designed
to limit exchange rate variability. Before discussing the arguments for and
against exchange rate policies, the paper reviews evidence on the
effectiveness of the most common instrument used to control exchange rates,
foreign exchange intervention.
2. The Effectiveness of Foregp Exchange Intervention
The central question addressed in this section is the following: does
foreign exchange intervention constitute a separate instrument of exchange
rate policy, or does it work solely through its effects on domestic and
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foreign money supplies. If the latter is the case, then intervention must be
considered in the broader framework of monetary policy.
2.1. Definition of Foreign Exchange Intervention
This section begins with a definition of foreign exchange intervention.
Intervention is difficult to define because there are many ways in which the
monetary authorities can influence exchange rates. The Working Group on
Exchange Market Intervention, commissioned to study foreign exchange
intervention by the Versailles Summit of June 1982, adopted a narrow
definition of intervention modified to include certain "passive" operations.
According to the Working Group's Report (hereafter referred to as the
Jurgerisen Report),21 the narrow definition consists of "any sale or purchase
of foreign exchange against domestic currency which monetary authorities
undertake in the exchange market." It includes all central bank purchases and
sales of foreign exchange against domestic currency, whatever form of
financing is used (reserves, swaps, official borrowing, etc.). The Jurgensen
Report adds to this narrow definition three forms of "passive" intervention:
sales concluded by the central bank with public sector entities including the
central government (which would otherwise have undertaken the transactions in
the exchange market), IMF drawings, and interest payments on international
reserves. This definition makes intervention equivalent to the change in the
monetary authorities' net foreign currency assets excluding any capital gains
on existing assets. The definition specifically does not include exchange
market transactions carried out by other private or public entities which
might be considered to be "directed" by the government or central bank (such
as Eurodollar loans to public authorities) because it is so difficult to
establish the intent of the authorities in the case of such transactions.
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More important than the precise definition of intervention is the
distinction between sterilized and non-sterilized intervention. The Jurgensen
Report defines sterilized intervention as a "change in the monetary
authorities' net foreign currency assets which is offset by a corresponding
change in their net domestic assets so that their monetary liabilities (or,
specifically, the monetary base) remains unchanged" (p. 6). Non-sterilized
intervention, in contrast, involves a one-for—one change in the authorities'
net foreign currency assets and the monetary base. Non-sterilized
intervention thus is a form of monetary policy, distinquishable from
conventional open market operations only in the asset being exchanged for
money.22 There is virtually unanimous agreementamong economists that non-
sterilized intervention can affect exchange rates, just as more
conventionally-defined monetary policy can undoubtedly affect exchange
rates. The effectiveness of sterilized interventior, in contrast, is a much
more controversial topic. Yet if foreign exchange intervention is to be
regarded as a separate instrument of economic policy, distinct from monetary
policy, then it must take the form of'sterilizedintervention.
2.2. Effectiveness of Sterilized Intervention
There are three distinct channels through which sterilized intervention
can affect exchange rates.23 The first is the most straightforward:
sterilized intervention works by altering the supplies of assets in private
portfolios, thus requiring a realignment of asset returns. This portfolio
balance channel requires that foreign and domestic securities be imperfect
substitutes. The more substitutable are these securities, the smaller is the
realignment of asset returns, and thus the smaller is the change in the
current exchange rate, required to rebalance portfolios. In the limiting case
of perfect substitution between securities, where investors regard domestic
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and foreign bonds as interchangeable, sterilized intervention is completely
ineffective, at least through this portfolio balance channel.
The other two channels operate through announcement effects requiring
either market inefficiencies or superior information on the part of the
authorities. If the market is inefficient, intervention operations may help
to focus the attention of the public on hitherto neglected factors even though
the operation itself provides no new information. It is difficult to provide
a convincing rationale for why market operators would neglect publicly
available information, or why intervention would refocus their attention on
this information. But we cannot rule out this possibility a priori.
Alternatively, the intervention operation could provide new information by
signalling the private market about the future monetary policies of the
authorities.21 This last channel could operate even if the market were
efficient, in the sense that market participants incorporate all available
information in forming their expectations, since the authorities naturally
have superior information about their future intentions.
There is extensive empirical research on the effectiveness of sterilized
intervention. Although this evidence is far from conclusive, it is strong
enough to have led the Jurgensen Report to conclude that "there was broad
agreement among the members of the Working Group that sterilized intervention
alone did not appear to have constituted an effective instrument in the face
of persistent market pressures" (p. 20). Whether or not sterilized
intervention might have a short-term impact through announcement effects was
less clear to the Working Group.
The Jurgensen Report's conclusion is based on two different types of
evidence. First, there are tests of "speculative efficiency", which are
actually joint tests of uncovered interest parity and market efficiency.
27. 18 .2Second, there are estimates of portfolio models designed to determine the
influence of bond supplies on risk premia. These two sets of evidence reach
sharply different conclusions.
"Speculative Efficiency" Tests
Tests of "speculative efficiency" are based on uncovered interest parity,
the equality of expected returns on securities denominated in different
currencies. If uncovered interest parity holds, the expected interest return
on a dollar security should equal the expected return on a foreign currency
security measured in terms of'dollars(the expected return consisting of the
foreign interest rate plus the expected capital gain or loss on the foreign
currency).25 The expected returns will be equal whenever investors regard the
two securities as perfect substitutes. If investors are risk—averse, on the
other hand, then they will regard two securities denominated in different
currencies as imperfect substitutes, and a risk—premium will separate the two
expected returns. In that case, sterilized intervention might be effective if
it can change the relative supply of dollar and non-dollar securities enough
to affect the risk premium.
To determine whether uncovered interest parity holds, investigators must
examine actual, not expected, returns (since expected returns are not
observable). Uncovered interest parity does not ensure that actual returns
are equal on securities denominated in different currencies. But the
differential between these returns should be random as long as the forecast
errors from predicting exchange rates are random, which will be the case if
the exchange market is "efficient." The "speculative efficiency" test, which
tests jointly whether uncovered interest parity holds and the exchange market
is efficient, thus examines whether actual returns on securities denominated
in different currencies are equal except for a random factor.
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During the 1970s, a score of investigators ran tests of speculative
efficiency using different time periods and currencies. With few exceptions,
they were unable to reject the speculative efficiency hypothesis. The
evidence was strong enough for Mussa (1979, p. 214) to conclude in his summary
of empirical regularities in the foreign exchange market that "the interest
differential in favor of domestic currency bonds is equal approximately to the
expected rate of depreciation of domestic money in terms of foreign money."
Recent studies, however, have been able to reject the speculative
efficiency hypothesis using longer data sets and more sophisticated
statistical techniques.26 In fact, they have provided such convincing
evidence against speculative efficiency that researchers have turned their
attention towards explaining deviations from uncovered interest parity in
terms of risk premia (while maintaining the hypothesis that the exchange
market is efficient).
Direct Evidence of Risk Premia
If investors are risk averse, the expected returns on securities
denominated in different currencies will be separated by a risk premium which
is a function of the relative supplies of foreign and domestic securities,
domestic arid foreign wealth, and other factors.27 Investigators have searched
for evidence of this risk premia without success. Rogoff (19814), for example,
finds no evidence that the interest differential between U.S. and Canadian
bonds is sensitive to the relative supply of these bonds. (So he finds no
evidence that sterilized intervention in the Canadian dollar market, which
would alter the relative supplies of U.S. and Canadian dollar bonds, could
affect exchange rates). Other investigators have used more elaborate models
to £nvestigate risk premia, but have reached conclusions similar to those of
Rogoff.28
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Interpreting the Conflicting Evidence
The two sets of evidence from speculative efficiency and portfolio
balance studies seem to give conflicting results. The studies of speculative
efficiency suggest the importance of a time—varying risk premium, but the
portfolio balance studies are unable to explain that risk premium in terms of
relative asset supplies. There are at least three ways to reconcile this
evidence. First, an appeal can be made to market inefficiencies which would
account for the ex post interest differentials without appealing to a risk
premium. But to date no one has provided a convincing rationale for why
traders would fail to eliminate any perceived profit opportunities in the
foreign exchange market. Second, it may be the case that, even though a time-
varying risk premium is important in explaining interest differentials,
sterilized intervention (or any other change in relative bond supplies) has a
negligible effect on that risk premium. Third, existing empirical methods may
not be sophisticated enough to establish the effectiveness of sterilized
intervention. Unfortunately, there is no basis for choosing between these
last two alternatives. It is evident that the menu of' assets available to
investors is much larger than the choice between domestic and foreign bonds
modelled in many studies. Portfolio decisions, moreover, have an
intertemporal dimension in which consumption and investment decisions are made
simultaneously, in contrast to the static models that form the basis of
existing empirical estimates.29 It is unclear whether or not more
sophisticated empirical models, based on a larger menu of assets and
incorporating intertemporal decisions, would confirm or refute existing
empirical evidence. To date, however, there is no evidence that sterilized
intervention can affect exchange rates, at least through conventional
portfolio balance channels. On the basis of existing evidence, therefore, it
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is difficult to justify using sterilized intervention to carry out exchange
rate policy.
If sterilized intervention is ineffective, a second conclusion follows:
to pursue active exchange rate management, there is no substitute for monetary
policy. Monetary policy can be pursued either with traditional domestic
instruments or with non-sterilized foreign exchange intervention. Whether the
latter is called monetary policy or not is of little importance.
Yet even if monetary policy is necessary for exchange rate management,
there is still a potential role for sterilized intervention if such
intervention provides a signal to the market about future monetary policy.
Because of the very nature of announcement effects, however, it is difficult
to find evidence of them using conventional statistical methods. Two
successive intervention operations of equal size may provide different signals
to the market, so they may have different effects on the exchange rate.
2.3. Two Episodes of Foreign Exchange Intervention
Because statistical evidence leaves the question of announcement effects
unresolved, one might believe that the study of specific episodes of active
foreign exchange intervention might help to resolve this question. Such
episodes are difficult to interpret, but two particularly interesting are
singled out for study. These are the November 1, 1978, announcement of a
dollar defense package by the Carter Administration and the G—5 intervention
of September 1985.
1978 Dollar Defense Package
This episode bolsters the Jurgensen Report's view that intervention can
have significant short term effects. But the ultimate failure of the defense
package, despite the fact that the U.S. authorities assembled $30 billion for
foreign exchange intervention, suggests that short term intervention packages
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alone are not effective unless they are followed by longer termchanges in
monetary policy. The dollar defense package came at a time when the foreign
exchange market was in disarray reflecting the growing loss of confidence in
the policies of the Carter administration. In her in-depthstudy of this
crisis, Margaret Greene (19814, p. 28), a senior official in the Federal
Reserve Bank of New York, describes the market as follows:"During the last
week of October, the selling of dollars reached near-panicproportions, and
dollar rates plummeted to record lows against several major currencies."
After the President announced an anti-inflationprogram on October 24, a
program received by skepticism by the financial markets, the authorities sold
almost $1 billion equivalent of marks. Yet the dollar droppedagainst the
mark from DM1.81/$ to DM1.72/$ over the next four trading days.Similarly,
the dollar dropped against the yen from 181/$ to 178/$.
The package announced on November 1, in contrast to the anti-inflation
program, was an impressive one. First, monetary policy was tightened, with
the discount rate raised by an "unprecedented" 1 percentage point to a (then)
historic high of 9%. (Thus the package had an important monetary policy
component.) Second, a $30 billion package of foreign currency resources was
assembled for future intervention consisting of $15 billion in swaps with
foreign central banks, $5 billion in drawings on the IMF and sales of SDRs,
and $10 billion in so—called "Carter bonds", U.S. Treasury notes denominated
in marks and Swiss francs to be sold abroad.
The market was obviously impressed with the scope of the package and the
resolve about future policy which it seemed to represent. By 9:13 a.m. on
November 1, the dollar had moved 7% above the previous day's low against the
mark to DM1.83/$.30 Within 23 minutes, the dollar had moved up another 1%
against the mark while the Desk sold the equivalent of $69 million marks, to
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SF1.5671$ while the Desk sold $19 million of Swiss francs, and to 1187.57$
with the Desk selling $5 million. As Figure 6 illustrates, by the time of the
closing in London the dollar had risen against the mark to DM1 .85/$ and
against the yen to 1186.51$. By the end of the (New York) day, the dollar had
risen to DM1 .879/$ and to 1187.9/$, up seven to ten percent from its lows of
the day before. The foreign exchange intervention undertaken by the Desk that
day amounted to a little more than $600 million, over two-thirds of it
consisting of intervention in the market for marks.
The U.S. authorities, in cooperation with the Bundesbank, Swiss National
Bank, and Bank of Japan, had to intervene repeatedly in the following weeks as
the market tried to test official resolve. Figure 6 shows that the dollar
stabilized at around DM1.90/$ and 1190/$ through the first two weeks of
November, then rose somewhat more in the following two weeks. By the end of
November, U.S. intervention had totalled more than $3.5 billion. On
December 1, the spot rates for the dollar were DM1.9/$ and 1203.57$, both
rates being significantly above the October lows.
This episode illustrates the effectiveness of monetary and exchange
market operations in halting a currency's slide. But it also illustrates the
limitations of such action if not followed up by more fundamental changes in
monetary policy and macroeconomic policy in general. The rise of the dollar
stalled in early December as market participants became skeptical again about
the Carter Administration's policies towards inflation. Then the dollar was
hit by the shock of an OPEC price increase of 114.5% following the political
upheavals in Iran. During the month of December, foreign exchange
intervention was almost as sizable as in November, totalling more than 3.1
billion. Yet no new monetary policy initiatives were taken. By the end of
















































































































































impact of the November 1 package had faded, and the time afforded to make more
fundamental adjustments in policy had been squandered. As Greene summarized
the episode (19814, p. 140): "If this time is not put to productive use, then
intervention alone, no matter how large or how well coordinated, will not be
effective."
G-5Intervention in September 1985
The dollar rose through most of the four years of the first Reagan
Administration, peaking in February 1985. After falling from its February
highs during the following spring and summer, the dollar began to rallyin
early September. That rally was cut short by the Group of Five (G-5) meeting
of finance ministers and central bank governors in New York on Sunday,
September 22. According to the G-5 statement issued at the end of' that day
(IMF Survey, October 7, 1985, p. 297):
The Ministers and Governors agreed that exchange rates
should play a role in adjusting external imbalances. In
order to do this, exchange rates should better reflect
fundamental economic conditions than has been the case. They
believe that agreed policy actions must be implemented and
reinforced to improve the fundamentals further, and that in
view of the present and prospective changes in fundamentals,
some further orderly appreciation of the main non-dollar
currencies against the dollar is desirable. They stand ready
to cooperate more closely to encourage this when to do so
would be helpful. [Emphasis added.1
The statement had an immediate effect on exchange rates. As the Harris Bank
Foreign Exchange Weekly Review later remarked: "Foreign exchangetraders were
taken by surprise, and the dollar dropped sharply following the announcement,
even before any official intervention occurred" (February 7, 1986, p.1).In
Figure 7, daily exchange rates for the yen are illustrated.The dollar fell
against the yen from 2140.1/$ to 231.7/$ by the closein London on Monday the
























































































































































fell sharply against the mark fromDM2.81414/$ on Friday September 22 to
DM2.680/$on the following Friday.
There is a puzzle in this dramatic movement.The exchange rates fell
despite the fact that interestdifferentials were virtually constant. In the
case of one month Eurocurrency deposits,for example, the interest
differential between dollar and yen depositsand between dollar and OH
deposits remained roughly constantthroughout the week. Indeed, both
differentials remained constant until late Octoberwhen the Japanese
-
authoritiestightened credit conditions in theirmarket. The fall in spot
rates in the absence of interest ratemovements may be due to pure
announcement effect of the G-5 communique.That is, the exchange rates may
have moved primarily because the G-5announcement signalled future changes in
policy rather than because of the foreignexchange intervention that followed
the announcement. This interpretationis bolstered by the fact that, even
though foreign exchange intervention
following the G-5 announcement was not
much greater than intervention in Februaryand March of 1985, exchange rates
moved much more after the G-5announcement.31
What did the G-5 announcement signal? TheBank for International
Settlements Annual Report (1986, p. 1149) citedtwo factors. First, the joint
communique gave a "convincing demonstrationof unanimity and common policy
resolve, and ... thesubsequent intervention operations were fully
coordinated and had the wholehearted supportof nearly all the major
industrial countries represented." The fact thatthe policy actions were
coordinated was said to be of crucial importanceboth because of the
potentially larger scale of any interventionoperations and because there was
more of an assurance that the authorities
of different countries would not be
working at cross purposes. Second, theG-5 statement marked a major change in
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U.S. policy which had shunned foreignexchange intervention since the
beginning of the Reagan Administration. As the BISdescribes it (1986, p.
1149),
ff]rom the point of view ofcredibility, it was of crucial
importance that, for the first time, the USauthorities,
whose capacity to sell dollars is inprinciple unlimited,
were seen to recognize the need for a furtherdownward
adjustment of the dollar.
Yet, given the evidence against sterilizedintervention, one must remain
skeptical about whether either factor, internationalcoordination or the
active participation of the UnitedStates, could have been decisive if the G-5
countries had simply announced a series ofsterilized intervention
operations. Instead, the G—5 announcementmay have moved exchange rates
because the market believed either that theintervention would be monetized or
that the intervention, even thoughsterilized, signalled future changes in
monetary policy.
In the case of the G-5announcement, the evidence is unclear whether or
not foreign exchange intervention wasmonetized. As indicated above, short
term interest differentials between thedollar and the mark or yen remained
constant from September 22 through most ofOctober. The first unambiguous
sign of changes in monetary policy occurred inJapan in the last week of
October. The dollar had begun torally somewhat, so the Japanese authorities
decided to tighten monetary conditions,sending short term interest rates from
6.5% to 8% in only a few days. Asa result, the yen resumed its upward rise.
Comparison of These Two Episodes
A comparison of these two episodes isquite instructive. The 1978
defense package bucked a downward trend of thedollar. If it had been the
signal for a fundamental change in U.S.monetary policy toward a more
restrictive stance, then the short termgains in strengthening the dollar in
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November and December 1978 might have been consolidated and extended into 1979
and beyond. But since no such fundamental change was forthcoming, the dollar
resumed its downward trend. The G—5 intervention, in contrast, was clearly
reinforcing rather than bucking a trend. In fact, it is useful to ask whether
the G—5 announcement and actions that followed were on balance successful in
driving the dollar down relative to its previous trend.
Figure 8 tries to answer that question by putting the period immediately
following this announcement into longer term perspective. This figureshows
the weekly movement of the yen from January through December 1985,
highlighting the G-5 announcement. The trend of the dollar againstthe yen is
downward throughout, but in the period immediately following the announcement
the dollar's fall accelerates. The same cannot be said of the dollar'sfall
relative to the mark. It is true that the G-5 announcement halts a temporary
rise in the dollar, but it merely restores that mark to its previoustrend.
These figures lend support to Martin Feldstein's (1986, p. 6) view that"for
Germany and other G5 countries, the Plaza (New York) meeting wasessentially a
nonevent." Yet even if Feldstein is right about currencies other than the
yen, the G-5 period may provide evidencefor announcement effects in the case
of the yen. Under one interpretation, the dollar fell relative tothe yen
because the market perceived a greater degree of cooperationbetween Japan and
the United States than in the previous four years, and a willingness onthe
part of the Japanese government to pursue a tighter monetarypolicy to drive
the yen down, a policy not actually put into effect until lateOctober.
** * * * * *
Thissection has established the limits of foreign exchange intervention
as a distinct' exchange rate policy. If interventionis monetized, it can have



















































































































































































































policy. If intervention is sterilized, in contrast, then its effects on the
exchange rate are thought to be minimal. The announcement of the intervention
may be the occasion for a rally in the exchange market, but perhaps only if
the market believes that the intervention signals broader changes in monetary
policy.
Because the evidence implies that sterilized intervention is ineffective,
the remainder of the paper assumes that monetary policy, broadly defined to
encompass non-sterilized intervention, is the prime instrument of exchange
rate policy. The discussion now moves from the choice of' policy instruments
to the design of exchange rate policy.
Exchange rate policy could take a variety of forms. Governments could
reestablish a system of fixed exchange rates, perhaps with wider bands to
accommodate greater variability of exchange rates. The fixed rates could be
confined to regional groupings of countries as in the European Monetary System
or encompass all industrial countries. Second, governments could retain the
present system of flexible exchange rates, but institute stricter rules
governing exchange rate management. Third, governments could establish a
system of target zones for exchange rates with "soft margins" which leave
governments with some discretion concerning intervention. All three
alternatives, which involve systemic changes in the international monetary
system, contrast sharply with ad hoc agreements like the G-5 intervention
which are designed to cope with specific exchange rate problems. The
following sections will explore these alternatives.
3. Putting Huinpty Dumpty Back Together Again: Restoring Fixed Exchange Rates
This section analyzes the case for returning to fixed exchange rates.
The first part considers the general rationale for fixing exchange rates. The
next two parts ask what lessons can be learned from two fixed exchange rate
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systems,the Bretton Woods System which lasted until 1971 and the European
Monetary System established in 1979.
3.1 Rationale for fixed exchange rates
Although many rationales have been offered in support of fixing exchange
rates, two are particularly prominent in most discussions. First, fixed
exchange rates help to neutralize financial disturbances which might otherwise
have an impact on the real side of the economy. Second, fixed rates provide
discipline to governments that might otherwise follow inflationary policies.
Each argument is considered in turn.
Sources of disturbances
Economists analyzing exchange rate regimes have often posed the following
question: Would fixed or flexible exchange rates be preferable in the presence
of a particular disturbance?Fixed exchange rates can be shown to be
superior when financial disturbances are predominant in an economy. A fall in
the demand for money, for example, can be neutralized by a reduction in its
supply leaving the exchange rate unaffected. If investors shift from domestic
money to foreign securities, this can be neutralized by intervention in the
foreign exchange market. In either case, the policy designed to keep the
exchange rate fixed also helps to keep the disturbances confined to the
financial sector, so that output and employment are left undisturbed. If
disturbances originate in the real sector of the economy, however, it is
difficult to make a case for preventing exchange rate movements since these
movements generally facilitate the adjustment of relative prices which real
disturbances require.32 A rise in demand for exports, for example, leads to
an appreciation of the domestic currency under flexible rates since the
increase in demand raises domestic interest rates and attracts capital from
abroad. The appreciation of the domestic currency, by shifting demand to
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foreign goods, helps to dampen the rise in domestic demand.33 Thus fixed
exchange rates (or target zones for exchange rates to be discussed below) are
better designed for periods when financial disturbances are predominant.
Most economists analyzing the desirability of foreign exchange
intervention have implicitly assumed that exchange rate fluctuations can be
traced directly to a particular disturbance or group of disturbances. The
case for foreign exchange intervention is much stronger if exchange rate
fluctuations instead reflect excessive volatility due to market
inefficiencies. If exchange rates are excessively volatile (as discussed in
Section 1), then fixed rates, or at least policies designed to limit exchange
rate fluctuations, may be called for even in economies where disturbances are
predominantly real in origin. Similarly, if exchange rates are driven by
speculative "bubbles," self-fulfilling expectations which depart from market
fundamentals, then exchange market intervention may be called for.
In the present context of the misaligned dollar, this characterization of
real and financial disturbances takes a more specific form. As mentioned
above, many economists trace the appreciation of the dollar during the first
four years of the Reagan Administration to the expansionary fiscal policy of
that administration. This fiscal expansion represents a "real" disturbance
because the defense buildup has shifted expenditure towards U.S. domestic
goods (both traded and nontraded). Branson (1986) points out that the
appreciation of the dollar has moderated the effects of the fiscal expansion
on domestic output and prices by switching domestic and foreign private
consumption towards foreign goods. If that appreciation had been prevented
through the monetary expansion required to keep exchange rates fixed, then the
real appreciation of the dollar required for adjustment in the real sector
would have been brought about by a rise in the U.S. price level rather than by
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anominal appreciation of the dollar.Branson suggests that higher U.S.
prices would not have been preferable to
the nominal appreciation and
consequent fall in the inflation rate that didoccur.
If instead of being causedby the fiscal expansion, the dollar'srecent
rise had been due to a speculativebubble or to a more conventionaltype of
financial disturbance, then thecase for fixing the exchange rate wouldhave
been stronger.3 In thepresence of financial disturbances, interventionto
limit or halt the appreciation of the
dollar would have helped to insulatethe
real sector from the disturbance.
Presumably this intervention would have had
to have been non-sterilized, in whichcase the intervention would have
involved a significant change inmonetary conditions. The question that has
to be asked is whether governmentsare willing to tie their monetarypolicy to
an exchange rate target in such circumstances.
Discipline
Proponents of fixed exchange rates often basetheir case on a second
rationale: fixed rates impose disciplineon national governments since
inflationary policies soon run up against a balanceof payments constraint.
It is true that a government
following inflationary policies under flexible
exchange rates must contend with the depreciationof its currency, but that
same government under fixed exchange rates islikely to have to contend with a
highly visible balance of payments crisis. If thecrisis results in a
devaluation of the domestic
currency, that change in currency values is likely
to be much more politicallydamaging than a gradual change incurrency values
brought about "by the market." This disciplineargument for fixed exchange
rates might appear to be a persuasiveone, especially after more than a decade
of high inflation when governmentswere free to pursue "independent" monetary
policies under flexible rates.
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In practice, however, the discipline provided byfixed rates is less than
complete for the following reasons:
(1) First, fixed exchange rates exert no disciplineover expansionary fiscal
policies, at least as long as capitalflows are highly sensitive to
interest differentials. Higher government spendingfinanced by either
taxes or bond issues induces an inflowof capital and a balance of
payments surplus rather thandeficit.35
(2) Second, the fixed rate system as awhole has no external constraint
unless currencies are tied to an externalstandard. If N-i currencies
are tied to a reserve currency, ascurrencies were tied to the dollar
under the Bretton Woods System, then thereis discipline for the system
as a whole only to the extent thatthe reserve currency country manages
to disciplineitseir.6 Under Bretton Woods, the United States main-
tained a relatively stable price level throughoutthe 1950's and early
1960's, but during the Vietnam War the Johnsonand Nixon Administrations
followed what were widely regarded as inflationary policies.
(3) If, instead, all currencies are tiedto a commodity like gold, then the
increases of the world money supply are dependenton chance discoveries
of' gold and can be affected by political instabilityin the producing
countries. If the gold supply does not increaserapidly enough to keep
pace with real activity, theneither the world price level must fall
(accompanied, most likely, by a fall inreal activity) or banking systems
must develop alternative means of payment (ashappened in the last half
of the nineteenth century). In times of crisis, moreover,governments
are unlikely to adhere to theexternal standard, since the stability of
their banking systems is likely to be regarded asmore important than the
credibility of their external standard. Duringseveral banking panics of
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the nineteenth century, even the Bank ofEngland, the stalwart defender
of the gold standard system, suspendedgold payments in an attempt to
stabilize its banking system.
(4) Whether or not the U.S dollar (as theNth currency) is tied to an
external standard, par values for all Ncurrencies can be changed. Once
a par value is changed, future commitments toa fixed rate system are
less credible than before, so countries mustweigh the benefits of a
change in parity against the loss of credibility. Ageneral lesson to be
learned from past exchange rate systems is thatgovernments will abandon
fixed pegs, even if only temporarily, ifexchange rate flexibility will
help to ease the adjustment of their economies toa major shock. This
was as true of Britain in the nineteenthcentury, despite its pivotal
role under the gold standard, as it was of Franceand later Britain in
the interwar period, and a host of countries inthe Bretton Woods
period. If governments are likely to abandonpegs in a crisis, then it
is necessary to ask what is the value of thediscipline afforded by fixed
rates. The answer must be that the value of thediscipline is highly
dependent on how participants in the financial marketsassess the
commitment of the government to thepar value and the likelihood of
shocks large enough to alter that commitment. Sothe discipline argument
is less decisive than it appears to be.
3.2. Weaknesses of the Bretton Woods System
The paper now turns to an assessment of the BrettonWoods System, the
fixed rate system which tied most currenciestogether during the post-war
period until 1971. After fifteen years of flexibleexchange rates, many
observers look back longingly at this period. Asalready noted, the
macroeconomic performance under Bretton Woodscompares favorably with that of
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themore recent period. Against this must be weighed someof the inherent
weaknesses of the Bretton Woods System which observers of the timeconsidered
major drawbacks of this fixed rate system.
Lack of Monetary Independence
The Bretton Woods System was often criticized for providing no discipline
for the reserve currency country (for the reasons discussed above).The
United States, in effect, was too free to pursue an independent monetary
policy to the detriment of the system as a whole. But an equallyserious
weakness of the Bretton Woods System was the lack of monetary independence
afforded to other countries of the system. The Bretton Woods System imposed
such an extreme form of discipline on these countries that independent
monetary policies to deal with disturbances were severelyhandicapped.
If one country tried to increase its money supply by increasingdomestic
credit in the banking system, then this led to an incipient declinein
interest rates and an outflow of capital which offset, at least partially,the
initial increase in the money supply.37 This offsetting effectof capital
flows is characteristic of any fixed exchange rate system withinternationally
mobile capital.
Capital Controls
If capital flows offset domestic monetary expansions or contractions, one
solution is to restrict such flows with controls of one form oranother. That
solution was adopted widely under the Bretton Woods System.The recent period
of exchange rate flexibility, by no coincidence, haswitnessed the progressive
dismantling of controls beginning with controls in Germanyand the United
States in 197k, and Britain in 1978 and Japan in several stagesbeginning in
1980. Of the major industrial countries during this period, Italyhas
maintained and France has enhanced their controls, but thatis because they
27. 18.2have had to defend exchange rate parities within the European Monetary
System.38
The overall effectiveness of capital controls in stemming reserve flows
is in some doubt since banks and other institutions go to some lengths to find
ways to evade controls. But there is no doubt that controls distort
investment and borrowing incentives as two episodes from the Bretton Woods
period will illustrate.
(1) The Kennedy and Johnson Administrations constructed progressivelymore
complex barricades in an attempt to stem outflows of capital from the
United States during the 1960s. In 1963, the Kennedy Administration
began with an interest equalization tax on securities issued by
foreigners in the U.S. market. The Johnson administration followed with
its voluntary credit-restraint program in 1965 which limited the liquid
foreign assets that U.S. banks and non-bank financial institutions could
hold, and a direct investment program in that same year which compelled
U.S. corporations to finance overseas operations with funds raised
outside the United States. U.S. banks responded by expanding their
operations in London and other foreign centers, in part to serve the U.S.
corporations driven abroad for financing. With the arbitrage link
between the United States and foreign financial centers severed, large
interest differentials developed which reflected the distortionary
effects of the controls. At one point in 1969, the three-month
Eurodollar deposit rate rose to 11.5% at a time when U.S. Treasury bill
rates were at 7.7% and U.S. certificate of deposit rates (because of the
Federal Reserve's Regulation Q) remained fixed at 6%. Such remarkably
large differentials distorted financing decisions by U.S. and foreign
corporations. The controls also had the unintended effect of giving
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infant industry protection to the Eurodollar and Eurobond markets in
London.
(2) Similar interest differentials developed between Germany and the
Eurocurrency markets in response to a network of controls which the
German authorities built beginning in 1971. The controls were
progressively tightened in an attempt to close loopholes, finally
extending to nearly all claims by non—residents to residents, until they
were removed in early 19714. Figure 9 compares the internal German
interest rate (on interbank loans) with the Euromark deposit rate (which
is always approximately equal to the covered Eurodollar rate). The
figure illustrates very clearly the effects of the controls which were
designed to limit inflows rather than outflows of funds, and therefore
led to a higher interest rate in Germany than in the market for mark
deposits in London. At one point in early 1973, the differential between
the internal and external markets reached the remarkably high level of
11%. That is, an interbank loan in Germany carried an interest rate 11%
higher than a mark-denominated loan, perhaps made by the same bank, in
the Eurocurrency markets. With differentials that large, there is no
doubt that considerable managerial effort was expended in finding ways to
evade such controls.
The U.S. and German controls were not isolated examples. In fact,
controls were the norm during the Bretton Woods period. As discussed below,
they are also a prevalent feature of the European Monetary System.
Exchange Rate Crises
In the 1960's there was a tendency to blame private agents in the
financial markets for the "speculation" which brought on balance of payments




































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































speculators who took positions against the pound as the "Gnomes of Zurich".
More recently, however, international economists have formulated "balance of
payments crisis" models whose central actors are these same Gnomes, now
transformed into rational investors who speculate against governments. These
governments, in turn, blindly follow domestic credit expansions that are
unsustainable. The Gnomes help to accelerate the date of the crisis, a crisis
that is in any event inevitable, but otherwise act like responsible citizens.
There is no doubt some truth in both views of balance of payments
crises. As politicians of the 1960s knew only too well, increased capital
mobility makes it more difficult for governments to sustain parities that are
under attack by speculators. But, on the other hand, the decision to change
parities is often dominated by political considerations because governments
have committed themselves to defending parities. When parity adjustments
justified by economic factors are postponed on political grounds, speculators
attempt to force the government's hand. The government may respond by
instituting restrictive macroeconomic policies simply to defend a parity
value, policies which under a flexible rate system it might be able to
avoid. Or it may attempt to shield its reserves from attack by restricting
capital movements. Jhether the government successfully defends the parity or
riot, the country loses. If the parity holds, the economy is disrupted by the
crisis and by the policies which have been adopted to defend the parity. If
the parity collapses, speculators win capital gains at the expense of the
central bank. We illustrate several of these features of exchange rate crises
by describing the sterling crisis of the mid—1960's.
The Sterling Crisis
This crisis began building at the time when Harold Wilson's Labor
Government came to power in October ig6'4. The Wilson Government chose riot
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to devalue at that time despitea strong economic case that devaluationwould
help restore British competitiveness. One
prominent reason given for the
decision was the Government's fearthat it would be identified as the
"devaluation party," the LaborParty having devalued (in 19L9) the lasttime
it was in power. (This isa good example of the disciplineprovided by a
fixed rate system, although inthis case the disciplinepostponed needed
adjustments).
Having made the decision not todevalue, the Government had to face a
series of balance of payments crises
beginning soon after attaining office
when it had to arrange a $3billioninternational credit from foreign central
banks. (This was at a time when Britishbank reserves totalled only $2.6
billion and the monetary base $9.1billion). The Government managed to
surmount each crisis, in part byarranging foreign central bank financing but
also by instituting restrictivemacroeconomic policies, until the fall of 1967
when the speculative pressure becameoverwhelming. On the final day before
devaluation, Friday November 17, Britishforeign exchange reserves fell by $1
billion (in a country where capitalcontrols were as tight as anywhere in
Western Europe) (Solomon, 1977,p. 95). The next day sterling was devalued by
11L3%. Not only did the Government haveto succumb to the pressures of
foreign exchange speculation, but indoing so it lost over £350 million as a
result of intervention in the forward markets.
In his assessment of thesterling crisis, Robert Solomon, a former senior
adviser at the Federal ReserveBoard, points out two lessons of the sterling
crisis:
It exhibited the potential for, and theimpact of,
speculative flows in the accounts of a majortrading
country It pointed up the weakness of anexchange
rate system in which a change ofparity of a major currency
became a political issues of the highest orderthat engaged
heads of' state; in such a systema change in the exchange
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rate could be excessively delayed, permitting the build-upof
a large imbalance which, when action was finallytaken to
correct it, required massive shifts of resources.
These same two lessons were consistent themes inthe exchange rate crises of
the Bretton Woods system until its demise in 1971.
These weaknesses of the Bretton Woods System turned opinionsharply
against fixed exchange rates, especiallyafter the failure of the Smithsonian
Accord of' December 1971 (to be discussed below). It was onlyafter a near
decade of floating that sentiment turned back againstflexible rates, at least
in Western Europe where the European Monetary System wasestablished in 1979.
3.3. The European Monetary System
The European Monetary System (or EMS) was established onMarch 13, 1979
to tie together the currencies of member countriesin a joint float against
the dollar and other foreign currencies. The initial membershipof the EMS
consisted of all European Community members except theUnited Kingdom which
elected to float freely.1 All members except Italy agreedto limit
fluctuations of their currencies to 2% around a grid ofcentral rates; Italy
adopted a 6% margin. As stated by the EuropeanCouncil in its Resolution of
December 1978, the main objective of the EMS was to create a"zone of
stability in Europe." The following evaluationof the EMS's success in
achieving this objective is based primarily on anexcellent statistical
analysis by Rogoff (1985).142
Reducing the Variability of Exchange Rates
Thissection begins by examining the success of the EMSin reducing the
variability of exchange rates. There is evidencethat the variability of
bilateralexchange rates has been significantly reducedin the EMS. Rogoff
measures exchange rate variability by thevariances of unanticipated changes
in exchange rates.3 For both nominal and realbilateral rates, the variances
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havefallen for exchange ratesbetween the mark and theother two major
currencies, the French franc andlira. In the case of thenominal franc/DM
rate, the variance of
monthly prediction errors hasfallen by two-thirds,
while in the case of the
nominal lira/DM rate, thereduction has been by
almost four-fifthsThe results for realexchange rates are lessdramatic,
but still statistically
significant. This is fora period when bilateral
rates between the mark anddollar or yen werebecoming more, not less,
volatile.
Countries in the EMS,however, should be Concernedabout the variability
of effectiveexchange rates as well as EMS
bilateral rates. There issome
reason to believe that the
stability of intra—EMS bilateralrates is purchased
at the price of greater
variability in exchange rates betweenEMS currencies
and those of other
countries, so the EMS may not havestabilized effective
exchange rates. Rogoff showsthat among the threemajor EMS currencies,
only the lira has experienced
a reduction in volatility forits nominal
effective exchange rate. Asimilar patternemerges for the real effective
exchange rate, with the lirabeing the only currencyamong the three to
experience a significant reduction
in volatility. it shouldbe pointed out
that countries outside theEMS, including the UnitedStates, United Kingdom,
and Japan, experienced
statistically significant increases inthe volatility
of real effectiverates, so the EMS may havehelped to prevent thevolatility
of EMS currencies from
rising even in the case of the francand mark.
Role of Capital Controls
Another set of evidence,also due to Rogoff, providesan interesting
perspective on how the EMS works,
Rogoff examined real interestdifferentials
within the EMS, If mostdisturbances are financial innature, then foreign
exchange intervention that stabilizes
exchange rates should also stabilize
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interest rates. Yet, as Rogoff shows,
the variability of real interest rate
differentials has increas4 in the EMS,at least between the three largest
countrieS.5 There are two possible interpretationsof this result, neither
of them favorable to the EMS. First,disturbances may have been primarily
real in nature. But if this isthe case, then foreign exchangeintervention
within the EMS is undesirable (seethe discussion of intervention policy
above). Or capital contrpi may havebeen a major factor contributingto the
stability of EMS exchange rates.If the EMS is held together by extensive
capital controls, it providesmuch less of a model for a world exchangerate
system.
GiavazZi and Giovannifli (1986) presentan interesting analysis ofthe
role of French and Italian capitalcontrols within the EMS. Figure10
reproduces their graphs of'interest differentials between the(free)
EurocurrencY markets andnational markets in French franc andlira
instruments. Large differentials
between the free and regulatedmarkets
emerge at times of exchangerate crises. (In normal timestrade credits,
which are largely exempt from thecontrols, are sufficiently largeto
eliminate any differentials). These
interest differentials which emergein
times of crises show how bindingthe controls are on investmentflows.U6
Nonetheless, the controls appear tobe essential if the authorities areto
defend weak currencies of the EMSfrom speculative attack. AsGiavazZi and
Giovannifli (1986, p. L73) conclude:
In the present system weak currency
countries have to choose
between the welfare lossesassociated with capital controls
and the losses arising from thevolatility of short-term
interest rates, and, as the evidenceshows, overwhelmingly
opt for the former. Thuscapital controls appear tobe an
important feature of the EMS,which allows weak currency
countries to take part in the exchangerate arrangement,
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Source: Glovannini and Giovazzi, 1986,p. 468.Thus we have in the EMS an exchange rate system whichhas managed to stabilize
bilateral exchange rates within Europe, but only by severelylimiting capital
flows between the countries of the EMS. Perhaps thatis the only way to
maintain fixed exchange rates in today's environment.
Other Features of the EMS
One reason that capital controls are so essential to theEMS is that the
system has failed to bring about the convergenceof inflation rates among its
members, a key objective of theEMS.17 Rogoff compares five year average
inflation rates before and after the establishment ofthe EMS. He reaches the
surprising conclusion that any convergenceof inflation rates that did take
place was between the inflation ratesof Germany and two outside countries,
Japan and the United Kingdom.
Because inflation rates have been so divergent, frequent paritychanges
have been necessary among EMS currencies. Therehave been eleven realignments
since the inception of the EMS. The franc-DM parityalone has been changed
six times, the latest realignment being in January1987, for a cumulative
depreciation of the franc relative to themark of over 27 percent. Similarly,
the lira-DM parity has been changed seven timesfor a cumulative depreciation
of the lira of over 38 percent.
Some of the realignments have been quite large.The latest realignment
on January 12, 1987, involved a revaluationof the mark and guilder by only
three percent and the Belgian franc by two percent.But the April 1986
realignment lowered the franc relative tothe mark by 6 percent, while in July
1985 the lira was devalued 7.8 percent against allother EMS currencies and in
April 1986 fell 3 percent more relative tothe mark and guilder when those
currencies revalued by 3 percent. The frequencyand magnitude of' these
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realignmentssuggests how difficult it is to maintain a fixed rate system
today.
4. Managed Floating
The alternative to fixed exchange rates would seem to be flexible
exchange rates, but there are many shades of gray in between these two
extremes. Present exchange rate arrangements are usually referred to asa
system of managed flexibility. There are very few rules to this system, if
indeed the term "system" is appropriate to a laissez-faire world. In its 1978
amendments to its Articles of Agreement, the International Monetary Fund did
specify certain guidelines for exchange rate intervention. This section
begins by examining these guidelines, then turns to several more specific
rules for managed floating which have been proposed. Very different from
these rules are the taxes on exchange market transactions to be considered
next. Finally, "target zones" for exchange rates are analyzed in some detail
because they have received so much attention recently.
4.1. Alternative Approaches to Managing Exchange Rates
In the 1978 amendment to its Articles of Agreement, the IMF specified
three principles that should govern exchange rate policies:
Principle' A: A member shall avoid manipulating exchange rates or the
international monetary system in order to prevent effective
balance of payments adjustment or to gain an unfair competitive
advantage over other members.
Principle B: P. member should intervene in the exchange market if necessary to
counter disruptive conditions which may be characterized inter
alia by disruptive short-term movements in the exchange value of
its currency.
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Principle C: Members should take into account in their intervention policies
the interests of other members, including those of the countries
in whose currencies they intervene. (IMF Survey, May 2, 1977).
It is not easy for a group of governments with different agendas to
achieve agreement on a set of policy rules. So it may not be surprising that
the principles adopted in this agreement are not specific enough to be binding
on any government. Unless there are objective criteria for determining
whether or not a country is "manipulating" its exchange rate to gain unfair
competitive advantages, for example, Principle A may not prevent such
behavior. Even the definition of' "disruptive short-term movements" may prove
elusive once it is recognized that exchange rates naturally exhibit high
volatility. To ensure that these principles are carried out, some have
proposed more specific rules of exchange rate management.
Minimal Reform: The "Reference Rate" Proposal
One of' the most interesting proposals was that made by Wilfred Ethier and
Arthur Bloomfield (1975) in the Princeton Essay series. These economists,
writing soon after the breakdown of Bretton Woods, recognized that a return to
fixed exchange rates, whether desirable or not, was simply not feasible. So
instead of' specifying rules that mandated central bank intervention as had
been done in the Bretton Woods System, they proposed rules that prohibited
certain types of central bank actions. But unlike the IMF Principles later
adopted, they offered objective criteria for evaluating central bank adherence
to rules. The "reference rate" proposal which they formulated had two rules
(Ethier and Bloomfield, 1975, p. 10):
1.No central bank shall sell its own currency at a price below its
reference rate by more than a fixed percentage (possibly zero) or buy its
own currency at a price exceeding its reference rate by more than afixed
percentage. This is the sole restriction imposed upon central-bank
intervention.
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2.The structure of reference rates shall be revised at periodic pre—
specified intervals through some defined international procedure.
The aim of the first rule was to prohibit a central bank from driving its
currency away from its reference level (thereby "manipulating" its exchange
rate in the language of the IMF's Principle A). For example, a central bank
could not drive its currency down to gain, competitive advantage for its export
industry. At the same time, the proposal did not oblige the central bank to
intervene at all. (It is in this sense a "minimal reform" proposal). Nor did
the proposal prevent the central bank from "leaning against the wind" to limit
movements away from the reference rate.
The authors recognized that their proposal was limited in aim, but it did
provide a means to limit the type of competitive depreciations that had
plagued countries during the 1930's. In order for this proposal to be
successfully implemented, however, countries would have to agree on the
reference rates themselves "through some defined international procedure"
(their second rule). The discussion of target zones below identifies some of
the formidable problems involved in defining equilibrium exchange rates.It
also points out how difficult it would be for different national governments
to agree on equilibrium rates. Both of those problems carry over to any
agreement' on reference rates.
Rules for Leaning Against the Wind
Because volatility itself is viewed as a major problem by some
governments, policies of "leaning against the wind" have become common. Such
policies are designed to limit the "disruptive short—term movements" addressed
by the IMF's Principle B. This form of intervention requires minimal
knowledge of what factors may be moving the exchange rate, and does not
require that the authorities have superior knowledge about the long run
equilibrium exchange rate.It does presuppose that exchange rates are too
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volatile in general, and that intervention operations can be effective in
reducing this volatility.
There is a danger, however, that central banks might lean against the
wind more in one direction than the other, thus imparting a bias to exchange
rate movements over time. To ensure against "manipulating" exchange rates in
this way, central banks could be required to balance out their net purchases
and sales of foreign exchange over a given period. Argy (1982, p. 27) cites
one rule that "[n]et reserve changes in a given direction should not persist
for more than a few consecutive months (except when reserve levels are
excessive or deficient)." Argy, however, goes on to argue that such rules
would be difficult to implement, and might even provoke one-way speculation.
If governments wish to limit exchange rate volatility, there is a non—
market alternative to foreign exchange intervention. This involves imposing a
tax on exchange market transactions.
Tobin's Exchange Market Tax
This tax, proposed by James Tobin (1982), is imposed on each exchange
market transaction at a uniform rate, perhaps 1%. The tax has the explicit
aim of "throw[ing] some sand in the wheels of our excessively efficient
international money market" (Tobin, 1982, p. 89). According to Tobin, a tax
of this magnitude is unlikely to make much difference to merchandise trade
transactions, since the tax represents such a small proportion of the value of
the product and the profit on the transaction. But such a tax is likely to be
a much more significant factor in a round trip financial transaction, thus
discouraging "hot money flows." It would make overnight or one month
roundtrip investments in foreign currencies almost prohibitively expensive.
Even in the case of a three month investment, a 1% tax paid twice in the
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roundtriptransaction could be overcome only by an 8% differential between
interest rates in the two currencies involved.
For a tax of this nature to be successful, it must be uniformly imposed
throughout the world, for otherwise financial transactions will gravitate to
tax-free zones. The experience of U.S. controls in the 1960's illustrates
that point. If such a tax were somehow internationally coordinated, however,
it is likely to have a significant impact on the volume of foreign exchange
transactions, especially those associated with short term investments. For
that reason, the tax may reduce the volatility of exchange rates. But such a
tax is unlikely to have a significant effect on the misalignment of exchange
rates because longer term investments and trade transactions would remain
largely unaffected. William Poole has drawn an analogy between Tobin's tax
and a real estate transfer tax.8 The latter may reduce the volatility of
real estate prices, but surely does not affect the longer run level of
prices. Nor would it prevent a speculative bubble from developing.
Like the exchange market tax, the reform proposals governing intervention
outlined above offer no solution to the misalignment problem. They provide
"rules of the game" for managed floating, but they provide little positive
guidance for exchange rate policy. The first rule of the reference rate
proposal does prohibit central banks from deliberately creating a misalignment
through exchange market intervention, but none of the major misalignments
experienced recently have been caused by central bank intervention. None of
the rules prohibit other macroeconomic policies that can lead to
misalignment. Nor do they require that central banks take positive action to
prevent misalignments from developing. The paper will consider one type of
reform proposal, "target zones," which does address the misalignment
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problem. Since this proposal has received much attention recently, its
characteristics will be described in some detail.
4.2. Targets Zones for Exchange Rates
In the Bretton Woods System of fixed exchange rates, the national
authorities were committed to intervening in the foreign exchange market
whenever the exchange rate reached a 1% "band" on either side of its par value
vis—a—vis the dollar. A "target zone" system of exchange rates also has bands
for the exchange rate, but these bands are typically much further apart, thus
allowing considerable fluctuation in the exchange rate.More importantly, in
a target zone system the authorities make no firm commitment to defend those
margins. One of the leading advocates of target zones, John Williamson, has
described the zone as "a range beyond which the authorities are unhappy to see
the rate move, despite not being prepared to precommit themselves to prevent
such movements" (Williamson, 1985, p. 64).
Williamson's Proposal for Target Zones
Given Williamson's central role in the debate over target zones, it is
useful to spell out his proposal more fully.49 His target zones would involve
five elements (Williamson, 1985, 72):
(1) soft margins, rather than a commitment to prevent the rate from straying
outside the target zone;
(2) a zone perhaps 20 percent wide (i.e., with 10 percent margins), outside
of which rates would be considered 'clearly wrong';
(3) a crawling zone, with the crawl reflecting both differential inflation
and any need for balance of payments adjustment;
(4) publication of the target zone; and
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(5) the partial direction of monetary policy,including foreign exchange
intervention, to discourage the exchange rate from straying outside its
target zone.
The target zone system thus would be a form ofmanaged float with the targets
well defined but with national authorities onlytentatively committed to
intervention or other policy actions.
Anatomy of Target Zones
Target zones share some of the characteristics of fixed exchangerates,
but there are important differences whichmay be the source of both strengths
and weaknesses for this proposed system. Thepaper next examines some of
system's crucial characteristics, then addresses the question of howtargets
might be chosen.
(1) Wide Bands
With margins permitting fluctuations of twenty percent, thissystem is
not designed to limit the volatility of exchange rates. Thushedging by
corporations will be as important as in a flexible regime. But if the targets
are adhered to and the margins hold, then the system can be regarded as away
of avoiding misalignments.
The wide margins permit those abrupt shifts in speculative sentiment
which appear to characterize flexible regimes. Nonetheless,exchange rate
crises cannot be ruled out, at least when exchange rates approach themargins.
(2) Analogy with National Monetary Targets
Zones are more akin to national monetary targets than exchange rate
parities under the Bretton Woods System.Like monetary growth targets,
target zones for exchange rates single out one economic variable for special
attention without firmly precommitting the national authorities to achieving a
specific target for that variable.
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Yet there are important differences between monetary growth targets and
target zones for exchange rates. First, unlike the money growth targets, the
target zones provide no continuous guide for policy since the targets are
binding only when the exchange rate reaches one of its margins. It is true
that in some countries monetary growth targets are set in terms of bands, but
these bands are usually much narrower than those proposed for exchange rate
targets. Second, the variable targetted, the exchange rate, is an endogenous
variable which is normally determined by many factors other than economic
policy.It is true that the money supply is also an endogenous variable
affected by both bank and nonbank behavior, but the authorities have more
direct control over the money supply than the exchange rate.
(3) Anchor for System?
One of the advantages of a fixed rate system is the anchor such a system
provides for inflationary expectations. Target zones provide no such anchor,
since the zones are explicitly adjusted for differences in inflation rates.
The zones may help to anchor expectations regarding real exchange rates, but
only if governments are perceived as being willing to defend the margins.
(14) Commitment to Defend Margins.
Despite the wide margins around the targets, governments will eventually
be faced with the choice between defending the targets or changing them.
Economists advising a government faced with a speculative attack are likely to
advocate defending the targets only if they view exchange rate movements as
part of the problem. (Recall the discussion of economic disturbancesin the
previous section where exchange rates movements sometimes facilitated, rather
than hindered, the adjustment of the economy). Given a permanent shift in the
demand for a country's exports, for example, the government would be well
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advised to change the
exchange rate target rather than defendit. But if the
change is temporary, then defense ofthe target might bewarranted.
(5) The Political Economy ofTarget Zones
The rationale for targetzones is very different ifgovernments are
viewed as the principalsource of economic disturbances.
Target zones then
might have a political rather thaneconomic role to play instabilization.
Proponents of target zonesargue that announced exchange rate
targets might
constrain governments in their
macroeconomic policies, much likemultilateral
tariff agreements constrainnational trade policies.
In the specific context of the
dollar's misalignment, it isargued that
target zones might have
encouraged the Reagan Administration to followa less
expansionary fiscal policy. Thismay be a difficult argument to
sustain,
however, since in order to pursue its
fiscal policy, the Administration
overcame much stronger domesticconstraints than any internationalagreement
could have imposed.
A better case for thepolitical role of target zonescan be made in the
European context. A frequentargument in favor of the EuropeanMonetary
System is that it constrains member
countries to pursue policiesclosely in
line with, its largestmember, West Germany. The MitterandGovernment in
France, for example, stayed within theEMS despite being severelyConstrained
at times by the requirements of
membership. One major exception to this
European pattern is the United Kingdom
which has rejected joining the EMS
exchange rate arrangements in favor of freefloating of the pound sterling.
Perhaps the best that can be said for
this political justification for
target zones is that it may be relevant
to governments predisposed to the
constraints or strongly committed toregional or global cooperation. For
governments aiming to pursue policiessignificantly different from those of
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other industrial countries, target zones maybe swiftly discarded if they
become a major impediment tosuch policies.
(6)ObjectiveCriteria for Modifying Targets
The problem of constraining government
behavior would be less serious if
the target zone proposal did not providefor the modification of targets.
Here there is a direct conflict betweenthe politics and economics of
international agreements. In order toconstrain governments to keep
commitments, there should be no exceptionspermitted except those clearly
specified at the time of an agreement.But the economic arguments for
modifying targets in the faceof real disturbances may be very compelling.
To complicate the problem, thereis seldom a consensus among experts
about the need for changes inreal exchange rates. Instead, they may disagree
about the nature and scope of adisturbance as well as about itseffects on
the real exchange rate. Without objective
indicators dictating when targets
should be changed, the changes willmade based at least partly on political
considerations.
Consider the recent misalignmentof the dollar. Although the
appreciation lasted over four years,there is no clearcut consensusabout its
causes. The appropriate policiesto follow if the misalignmentis due to the
fiscal policies of the ReaganAdministration are very different fromthose to
follow if the dollar's appreciationis due to bubbles or to capitalflows
seeking a "safe haven" or to aninvestment boom triggered by taxchanges.5°
Similarly, although sterling's appreciation
lasted over (four) years,
economists still dispute whetherNorth Sea oil, tight monetary policies,or
other factors caused the appreciation.
When there is so much dispute about
the causes ofa misalignment, there
is unlikely to be a consensusabout
modification of targets.
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Defining Exchange Rate Targets
If economic conditions arefavorable, governments might be willing to
precommit themselves to a system of targetzones. But formidable problems
await the negotiators of such anagreement. Chief among these problems is
that of finding (and agreeingupon) appropriate targets.It is useful to
follow Williamson's description of howtargets might be defined:
(1) The first step in defininga target rate or target zone for the real
exchange rate is to decide about theappropriate equilibrium current
account balance of each country (or
equivalently, the "underlying capital
flow' in Williamson's terminology sincethe capital account must be the
mirror image of the current account). Theequilibrium current account of
a developing country like Brazil or Thailand isvery different from that
of an industrial country likeGermany or France. In estimates of his
"fundamental equilibrium exchangerate," Williamson makes explicit
allowances for such differencesamong countries. This is not to say that
judgments about equilibrium current accountsare easy to make, as the
experience of the Smithsonian meeting discussed belowmakes clear. Not
least of the problems is that thenegotiating governments will understand
the close connection between the currentaccount "equilibrium" agreed
upon and the prospects for their leading export industries.
(2) Once figures for equilibrium currentaccounts are agreed upon, then real
exchange rates consistent with them can be calculatedusing a trade model
with its associated trade elasticities. To doso, it is first necessary
to adjust the current account forcyclical factors, then to calculate the
discrepancy between the equilibrium current account and thecyclically
adjusted current account for a particularyear. The trade model is then
used to calculate the change in realexchange rates necessary to
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equilibrate the currentaccount.51 Since estimates of price elasticities
range widely, this step in thecalculation is fraught with
difficulties. Cutting the elasticities in half, for example,requires
twice as large a change in real exchange rates toachieve equilibrium.
(3) The calculations so far only determine the equilibriumreal exchange rate
in a single year. It is then necessary to adjust thatrate for real
disturbances that occur through time. Among such realdisturbances are
the oil price shocks experienced twice during the 1970s,natural resource
discoveries (such as North Sea oil for Britain), secularmovements in
demand, and secular movements in supply, includingdifferential
productivity growth rates. One issue thatarises is whether to take into
account changes in government policy if such changes arenot just
temporary measures but last for a numberof years. In his study of
exchange rates, Williamson explicitlyexcludes the shift in U.S. fiscal
policy under the Reagan Administrationbecause it is not sustainable in
the long run. He also excludes variations indemand or supply over the
business cycle from whatever source.
Most of these adjustments require that arbitrary judgmentsbe made.
Recall how difficult it was for analysts to evaluatethe effects of the first
OPEC price increase in 1973. Even the effectsof productivity growth are
difficult to assess. To illustrate some of thedifficulties involved in
determining equilibrium rates, the next sectionexamines the Smithsonian
greement of exchange rates, an agreementreached by the major industrial
countries in December 1971.
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Multilateral Agreement on Exchange Rates:the Smithsonian Accord
The Smithsonian Agreement providesone of the few examples of a
multilateral exchange rateagreement, but the lessons to be learned fromthis
agreement are none too encouraging about
exchange rate agreements in general.
First, the agreement was reached only afterprolonged and sometimes
acrimonious negotiations stretchingthrough the fall of 1971. One of the
reasons why the negotiations were so difficultwas that the objectives of the
participants were inconsistent with oneanother, which is not surprising given
the pivotal role played byexchange rates in each economy. The U.S.
Administration wanted to achieve a turnaboutof $13 billion in its current
account through the realignment of currencies.The other major countries of
the OECD envisaged, when their individualestimates were summed, a reduction
of their current balances of
only $3 billion (Solomon, p. 199). Thatan
agreement was at all possible in these circumstances
is probably attributable
to the heavy-handed actions of the NixonAdministration. In August 1971 that
administration imposed import surcharge of tenpercent in lieu of an agreement
to realign the major currencies.
Second, the agreement set new exchange rates thatwere simply
unsustainable in the long run, despite PresidentNixon's characterization of
the accord as the "most significant
monetary agreement in the history of the
world" (New York Times, December 19,1971, p. 1). It is interesting to
compare the rates agreed upon at the Smithsonianmeeting with those prevailing
a little over a year later after the Agreement hadbroken down and most rates
were allowed to float. Table 5 presents the centralrates agreed upon at the
Smithsonian meeting as well as the marketexchange rates prevailing in the
second quarter of 1973. The market ratesdiverge from the Smithsonian central
rates by more than ten percent in three out of fourinstances, with the dollar
27.18.2TABLE 5
CCI1PARISONOF SMITHSONIAN AND 1973 2ND QUARTER SPOT RATES




308.00 309.72 264.98 .114.O —14.4
2.6057 2.6886 2.5300 —2.9 —5.9
DM/$ 3.2225 3.1119 2.736 —15.1 —12.1
FF/$ 5.1157 4.8842 4.4288 -13.4 —9.3
*SmithsofliaflParities adjusted for changes in WPI for manufacturingfrom
December 1971 to second quarter 1973.
SOURCES: Bank for International Settlements, Annual Report,12th June 1972
for Parities; IMF, International Financial Statisticsfor Exchange
Rates; unpublished IMF Data for WPI forManufacturing.
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weaker after the advent of
floating than before (except inthe case of the
pound). The table alsopresents a comparison betweenthe market rates inthe
second quarter of 1973 and thecentral rates adjusted forchanges in prices in
order to see if the
divergence was caused by relativeinflation rates during
the interim period. (Wholesaleprices in manufacturingare used to adjust the
central rates.) In thecase of the yen and pound, themarket rates deviate
more from the adjusted centralrates than from the
original central rates; for
the other twocurrencies, the deviations aresmaller, but are still about ten
percent off the mark. Thus
an agreement reached only afterprolonged
negotiations resulted in an
exchange rate realignment that didnot go far
enough in lowering the value of thedollar.
The obstacles toagreement and to successful implementation
of target
zones are formidable. As James
Tobin, writing in 1978,expressed it: "it is
scarcely conceivable that the variousOECD countries couldindividually
project, much less agree on, much lessconvince skeptical marketsof, a system
of equilibrj or targetexchange rates for 1980 or 1985"
(Tobin, 1982,
p. 1493)52
Some advocates of target
zones acknowledge the economicarguments against
such a system, but nonetheless
contend that targets have a roleto play in
fostering international economic
cooperation. They argue that anagreement on
target zones at least commits
governments to regular consultationson exchange
market developmentsEven such regular
consultations, however, may not induce
governments to limit the divergences
in macroeconomic policies thatcause many




This paper began by describing twodistinct types of exchange rate
variability, volatility and misalignment.Each type of variability imposes
its own costs on an economy, andeach presents a different challenge to
exchange rate policy.
The volatility of exchange rates couldbe sharply curtailed if the
industrial countries agreed to reinstitute afixed rate system with narrow
bands. The EEC has succeeded in fixingbilateral rates within Europe,
although fixed rates within the EuropeanMonetary System have been maintained
only through frequent parity adjustmentsand through the imposition of
extensive capital controls.
In contemplating such a move, however,countries should recall the
lessons of the Bretton Woods System.Fixed rates cannot be maintained without
extensive capital controls. The paperhas analyzed the distortions to
investment and borrowing incentives that areentailed by such measures.
Balance of payments crises, moreover,
will inevitably break out unless
frequent parity changes are permitted.But if parity changes are permitted,
one of the chief benefits offixed rates, the credibility given toinflation
targets, will be lost. Fixed rates,finally, will inhibit the adjustmentto
real shocks like the oil price increasesexperienced in the 1970s.
Short of fixing exchange rates, countriescould pursue more active
foreign exchange intervention policies.
There might be a role for
international agreements to ensure thatintervention is confined to 'leaning
against the wind' operations or to preventintervention from allowing
countries to 'manipulate' exchange ratesto gain competitive advantages. The
analysis of foreign exchangeintervention policy above suggests thatthe
27. 18.2intervention would have to benon-sterilized, so active intervention would
require a compromise of monetary targets.
If misalignment is the most importantproblem, then the search for an
ideal exchange rate policymay be too narrowly focused to be effective. A
major source of misalignment in the last tenyears has been the macroeconomic
policies pursued by countries like the UnitedStates and Britain. It is not
at all clear that the solution to
major policy imbalances among the industrial
countries lies in limiting exchange ratemovements rather than changing the
policies themselves.
The adoption of target zones forexchange rates, on the other hand,may
have a useful role to play in inducinggovernments to modify their policies.
At the very least, the breaching oftarget zones may call attention to the
need for international consultationson macroeconomic policies. Whether
target zones would be any more successful than the IMFagreements remains to
be proven.
The Jurgensen Report concluded thatexchange rate policy must consist of
more than (sterilized) intervention to be successful.Countries must be
willing to commit their macroeconomic policies to
controlling exchange
rates. In many circumstances,governments may find that limiting exchange
rate variability is not worth this price.
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Footnotes
'The author is the James R. F. Guy Professor of Financeand Economics at
the Wharton School of the University of Pennsylvaniaand a Research Associate
at the National Bureau of Economic Research.He would like to thank William
Branson, Martin Feldstein, Dale Henderson,and Richard Herring for helpful
comments on an earlier draft.
The passages are from Paris, 1937, p. 166, and Harrod, 1951, pp. 582—814.
2Productivity tends to rise in recovery periods, so the recent rise in
productivity in these two countries maybe partly a cyclical phenomenon.
3Later sections discuss how measures of misalignment take into account
real economic shocks (which usually require departuresof exchange rates from
relative price trends).
useful survey of this literature is Frenkel and Mussa(19814).
5Kenen and Rodrik (19814) show that other measures of volatility give
roughly similar results.
6Similar results are obtained for earlier periods by Frenkel and Mussa
(1980) and Bergstrand (1983).
71f Rt measures the real exchange rate of the dollar relative to the
pound sterling, for example, then arise in Rt reflects either a rise in U.S.
relative to British prices (i.e., rises)or a fall in the dollar price
of the pound (Xt falls reflecting a depreciationof the pound). In either
case, a rise in Rt reflects aloss of competitiveness for U.S. exports.
8Notice how much less variable the effective exchange rates, which
represent a diversified basket of currencies,are compared with the bilateral
rates (whether nominal or real).
9just because most movements in an exchange rate are unforecastabledoes
not imply that the exchange rate is excessivelyvolatile, although companies
engaged in international trade may regardthe volatility as too high,
Instead, the volatility of an exchange rateis "excessive" if it exceeds that
of the factors which determine it.
10Meese and Rogoff (1983) examine the out-of-sample performance of
several well—known models of the exchange rate,and conclude that a random
walk model performs as well as any of thesemodels.
William5on'S concept of the "underlying capital flow" is linked to
current account targets (as discussed below inthe section on "Defining
Exchange Rate Targets").
is interesting to note that while the yen was morevolatile than the
dollar during the period 1973-85, the misalignmefltsof the dollar were larger
than those of the yen. This underscores theneed to carefully distinquish
between the two concepts.
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3Notethat a rise in the real exchange
rate represents a real appreciation of that currency.
14For further discussionof adjustment costs associatedwith
misalignments, see Branson (1981), Richardson(1984) and Williamson (1985).
15A pointed outby Williamson (1985), it is interestingthat Johnson saw misalignments arising from misguided interventionpolicy under fixed rates
(maintaining unrealistic parities) rather thanfrom market forces under flexible rates. Like most economistsat that time, Johnson did notforesee the large misalignments that were tooccur under flexible rates.
l6See Atkinson,Brooks, and Hall (1985). Note that thesecond round of OPEC price increases in 1978-79 raisedthe value of the North Seadiscoveries.
171f the realappreciation was equal to 45%, then 10%represents 2/9 of the entire loss of competitiveness.
Forsyth and Kay (1980) attribute alarger proportion of the appreciation to North Sea oil.
18These seriesare obtained from the IMF's InternationalFinancial Statistics. Because productivity
growth is generally greater in the
manufacturing sector than elsewhere in an advancedeconomy, real exchange
rates based on general price indexes (whichcontain nontraded as well as
traded goods) provide a less reliable indexof relative competitiveness than
real exchange rates based onmanufacturing prices alone. For further
discussion, see Marston (1986). For a discussion ofthe relative merits of value added deflators and unit labor costsas measures of international
competitiveness, see Artus (1978).
19There is noevidence, for example, that interest ratescharged on Eurodollar loans to Europeans rose relativeto loans to Pmerican residents.
20These figures, taken fromthe national income accounts, are smaller
than the balance of payments figureswidely quoted in the press, but are more
relevant for determining the effects of themisalignment on output and
employment.
21Ju'gensen Report, U.S.Treasury, 1983 p. 4. Philippe Jurgensen was
Chairman of the Working Group. Thecountries represented in this group were
the so—called Group of Seven (Or G-7)countries: Canada, France, Germany,
Italy, Japan, United Kingdom, and United States.
22Sterilized interventioneffectively consists of swapping foreign bonds
for domestic bonds, although theoperation has several steps to it.Recall that central banks typically holdforeign exchange reserves in the form of
interest—bearing, foreign currency-denominated securities.When a central
bank wants to intervene in theexchange market, it first sells the foreign
securities, then uses the foreign currency so obtained tobuy domestic
currency from the private sector. If the intervention is to besterilized, the sale of foreign currency is followedby an expansionary open market
operation (or an analogous monetary operation in differentinstitutional
environments) involving the purchase of domestic bondswith the recently
acquired domestic currency, thus restoring themonetary base to its initial
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level. For further discussion of such operations, seeGirton and Henderson
(1977) and Marston (1985).
23This description of the three channels draws on Loopesko (198)4).
214Mussa (1981) emphasizes the importance of' announcement effects in his
study of foreign exchange interventionfor the Group of Thirty. See also the
recent analysis of announcement effects by Kenen(1986).
25if'i
are the domestic and foreign interest rates, respectively,
and s is the expected change in the spot exchangerate (the capital gain on
the foreign currency), then uncovered interest parity impliesthat
it i +s
26Hansen and Hodrick (1980), for example, adopt a generalized least
squares estimating procedure sothat they can utilize overlapping
observations, thus making it possible to use weeklydata rather than the
monthly or quarterly data typically employedin the past. Cumby and Obstfeld
(19814) also use weekly data but adopt techniques totake into account the non-
stationarity of the foreign exchange data.These studies and others that have
followed are able to reject decisively the joint hypothesisof market
efficiency and uncovered interest parity.Levich (1985) provides a
comprehensive survey of recent studies.
27Two recent surveys of the theoretical literature on risk premia are
Adler and Dumas (1983) and Branson and Henderson(1985).
28See, for example, Obstfeld (1983), Frankel and Engel (198)4), and
Danker, Haas, Henderson, Symansky, and Tryon(1985).
29Studies of international asset pricing based on intertemporal utility
functions include Stulz (1981) and Hansen and Hodrick(1983).
30me following account relies heavily on Greene (19814).
31For a similar view, see Ueda (1986). Intervention in the autumn of
1985 totalled $13 billion dompared with $10 billionin February and March of
1985 (BIS 1986, p. 1)49).
32For a general analysis of foreign exchange intervention in the presence
of different types of disturbances, see Henderson(19814).
33Asimilar analysis applies to any aggregate demanddisturbance. The
effects of aggregate supply disturbances on the exchangerate, however, are
ambiguous since an increase in aggregate supplylowers prices at the same time
that output expands (so nominal output, and hence thedemand for transactions
balances, may rise or fall).
314Among those investigating speculative bubbles as the source ofthe
dollar's appreciation are Krugrnan (1985) and Frankeland Froot (1986).
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351fa government pursues an expansionary fiscal policy
indefinitely, then eventually foreign investors will balk at furtherexposure to Political
risk. But until that point is reached, acountry is free to expand through
fiscal means.
the reserve currency country follows anexpansionary monetary
policy, the resulting balance of payments deficits areautomatically financed,
since the country gaining reserves invests them in thesecurities of the
reserve currency country. The monetary base of thereserve currency country,
moreover, does not decline as a result of the deficit as long as other
countries choose to hold their foreign exchangereserves in the form of
securities rather than the monetary base of thereserve currency country.
McKinnon (1974) has proposed that all foreigncurrency reserves be held in the
form of central bank balances (bearing a market interestrate). If this were
the case, foreign exchange intervention would affectthe monetary bases of both reserve and non-reservecurrency countries alike.
If domestic andforeign securities are perfect sLthstituteS, theattempt by one country to increase its money supply through domestic creditexpansion succeeds only to the extent that this one countrymanages to increase the
money supply of the entire system. (The system would be like a set of
reservoirs connected by open channels; an attempt to increasethe water level
in one would succeed only to the extent that the waterlevels of all were
increased). Formal models of the offset phenomenon arepresented in Kouri and
Porter (197L) and Herring and Marston (1977).
381n 1986 bothItaly and France relaxed some of their controls, butmany transactions by residents remain restricted.
39For an excellent account ofthis period, see Chapter V of Solomon,
1977.
UOBank of England,Quarterly Bulletin, December 1969, Table 18.
41The members wereBelgium, Denmark, France, Germany, Ireland, Italy,
Luxembourg, and the Netherlands. The United Kingdom formally Joined theEMS, but chose not to participate in the exchange rate mechanism.For a detailed
discussion of the system, see Ungerer et al. (1983).
1420ne of'thesuccesses of the EMS which will not be discussed since it
lies outside the scope of the paper is the development of theEuropean
Currency Unit (or ECU) as a parallel currency. For an interestingdiscussion,
see Padoa—Schioppa (1985).
23He uses the forward rateas the predicted exchange rate in the case of
nominal rates and forecasts of real exchange rates basedon a random walk
model or a vector autoregression in the case of realexchange rates.
Canzoneri (1982) and Marston(198)4) analyze this possibility in
theoretical models of exchange rate unions.
145meoneexception is the real interest rate differential between
Germany and Italy formed by using a VAR forecast.
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U6Thecontrols also lead to asymmetric responses of EMS currencies to
outside disturbances, since among the three most important EMS currencies only
the mark has open capital markets. When there is speculative pressure
involving the dollar, for example, the mark takes the bruntof this pressure,
thus causing strains within the EMS. See Marston (1984).
7As Jacques van Ypersele, one of the architects of the EMS, has
described it: "The objective was indeed that external stability be the result
less of artificially imposed constraints than of a convergence of economic
trends among member countries, in particular of prices and costs" (Ypersele,
1984, p. 15).
8See Brainard and Perry, 1986, "Symposium on exchange rates, trade and
capital flows," p. 23LL Another tax that has been proposed byLeviatan (1980)
is the "real interest rate equalization tax." This tax, by creating a wedge
between domestic and foreign interest rates, tries to reduce theincentive for
outflows (or inflows) of capital when a country abruptly changes its monetary
policy. A country trying to stabilize its pricelevel through monetary
contraction, for example, would ordinarily have to contendwith an
appreciation caused by an inflow of capital. By creating a wedgebetween
domestic and foreign returns, however, a country might be able to dampenthe
currency appreciation. Such a tax is probablybest thought of as a supplement
to national monetary policies, to be used when one country's policies depart
sharply from those of other countries.
49Earlier advocates of targets for exchange rates include the "Optica
Group" of economists from EEC countries. See Commissionof the European
Communities (1975).
50Branson (1986) underscores the confusion regarding the source of the
dollar's rise by suggesting that misalignment is a "topic ... forthe
National Science Foundation, not a new Bretton Woods." (p. 176)
51For further discussion of this approach to estimating equilibrium
exchange rates and the problems associated with it, seeArtus (1978).
52There is reason to believe that agreements on equilibrium rates would
be even more difficult to achieve in the 1980s than in 1971. Expertsdiffer
widely in their estimates of equilibrium rates today,in large part because of
the many structural changes which have occurred since theSmithsonian
Agreement. Consider the key bilateral rate betweenthe yen and dollar.
Before the dollar recently plunged from 250/$ to Y160/$,estimates of the
equilibrium value of this bilateral rate were aswide ranging as the market
rates themselves. Williamson, for example, cites sixstudies with estimates
ranging from 131/$ to 209/$. Krause (1986)writes of a possible 1O0/$
rate. Changes in energy prices make all such calculationsdifficult. But
another major reason why the yen-dollar rate is difficultto assess is the
pattern of productivity growth in the UnitedStates and Japan which distorts
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